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ABSTRACT 
The under-governed space in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo provided an 
opportunity for the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) terrorist/insurgency organization to 
settle and establish its base. This thesis assesses whether this organization poses a 
security threat to the United Republic of Tanzania, specifically with regard to the export 
of terrorism. To better understand the ADF network, the thesis employs the visual 
analytics technique and social network analysis. The thesis concludes that the ADF do 
not appear to pose an imminent security threat to Tanzania, at least in the short term. 
However, there is a potential long-term threat for Tanzania, and as such, three strategies 
are proposed to respond to the ADF terrorist organization. These strategies are: targeting 
actors (organizations and individuals), reducing tangible support to the ADF, and 
sponsoring regional initiatives. The recommended strategy is to cut off tangible support 
to the ADF in order to weaken the ADF terrorist organization—not only in Tanzania, but 
also in the Congo’s east. 
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Terrorism has become the systematic weapon of war that knows no borders or 
seldom has a face. 
—Jacques Chirac 
A. BACKGROUND 
The ungovernability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 
prompted illegal armed organizations to locate there. The minimal presence or absence of 
government in the region has created a security vacuum. Rebel forces have filled this 
void—one such organization is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Tanzania is 
vulnerable to its attacks because of its attempts to crack down on all illegal forces in the 
eastern DRC, including the ADF. ADF’s association with the Somali-based al-Shabaab 
militants in East Africa also increases Tanzania’s vulnerability.1 Background on the 
terrorist incidences in East Africa is needed prior to considering the particular ADF 
threat.  
Terrorist incidents began shaking the East African region in the late 1990s. The 
map in Figure 1 highlights these terrorist incidents. They include the coordinated attacks 
of August 7, 1998 on the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and 
Nairobi (Kenya) by the al-Qaida terrorist group.2 Another one is the 2010 attack in 
Kampala, Uganda. It was perpetrated by al-Shabaab and ended up killing 70 people.3 Al-
Shabaab has also launched a series of attacks on Kenyan territory.4 In another 
                                                 
1 For details, see “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),” IHS Jane’s, September 3, 2013, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId
=+++1320703&Pubabbrev=JWIT; Nicholas A. Heras, “Ugandan Military Accuses DRC-Based Ugandan 
Militant Salafist Leader of Complicity in Nairobi Mall Attacks,” The James Town Foundation, October 31, 
2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d 
=41561&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=7&cHash=6017a9b5074c7a06ec54236007cf43cf#.UqD5-T7TlQK. 
2“Fast Facts: The Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,” CNN, October 6, 2013, accessed 
October 12, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/. 
3 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
4 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint 
Intelligence Bulletin, “Attack on Nairobi Mall Highlights Continued Threat from Al-Shabaab,” Public 
Intelligence, September 22, 2013, http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-FBI-WestgateMallAttack.pdf. 
 2 
development, on September 2013, al-Shabaab carried out the Westgate shopping mall 
attack (not shown on map). This was the most devastating attack to be conducted by al-
Shabaab in Kenya. Over 60 people were killed in cold blood.5 All these were retaliatory 
attacks after Uganda and Kenya deployed their troops to fight the al-Shabaab militants in 
Somalia.6 The Ugandan and Kenyan troops were deployed in Somalia in 2007 and 2011, 




Figure 1.  Map of Terrorist Incidents in East Africa. Source: The U.S. Department of 
State. 
                                                 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
7 “Somalia’s al-Shabaab Claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya Attack,” BBC, September 22, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24191606. 
8 DHS and FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Attack on Nairobi Mall Highlights Continued Threat from 
Al-Shabaab.” 
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To date, al-Shabaab still threatens the security of East Africa.9 This is evident 
through the group’s changing tactics; it has broadened the battleground from Somalia to 
Kenya. Unless Kenya and Uganda pull their troops out of Somalia, the organization has 
vowed to continue with such attacks.10 As al-Shabaab’s message on social media reads: 
“For long we have waged war against the Kenyans in our land, now it’s time to shift the 
battleground and take the war to their land.”11 Despite al-Shabaab’s threat, the 
organization does not seem to operate alone. The ADF is supposedly associating with the 
Somali-based al-Shabaab.12 For example, the group has allegedly assisted al-Shabaab in 
the planning of the 2010 Kampala attack13 and 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi.14  
Despite the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam, no major terrorist 
attack has occurred on Tanzanian soil.15 In fact, the United Republic of Tanzania is 
comparatively safe. It is politically stable and peaceful compared to other countries in the 
African Great Lakes region. According to a study conducted in 162 countries, the 2013 
Global Peace Index (GPI) indicates that Tanzania is the least violent country in this part 
of Africa, with an overall ranking of fifty-fifth position.16 It is followed by Uganda (106),
 
Rwanda (135), Kenya (136), and Burundi, which is ranked at 144. By contrast, the GPI 
                                                 
9DHS and FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Attack on Nairobi Mall Highlights Continued Threat from 
Al-Shabaab.” 
10 Laura Oneale, “Al-Shabaab Is Vowing to Continue with Their Terrorist Attacks,” Liberty Voice, 
October 2, 2013, http://guardianlv.com/2013/10/al-shabaab-is-vowing-to-continue-with-their-terrorist-
attacks/. 
11 Edmund Blair and Richard Lough, “Islamists Claim Gun Attack on Nairobi Mall, at least 39 Dead,” 
Reuters, September 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/21/us-kenya-attack-
idUSBRE98K03V20130921. 
12 For details, see David Tash Lumu, “Al-Shabab fighters joining ADF-Army,” The Observer, July 14, 
2013 accessed July 14, 2013, 
http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26405:al-shabab-fighters-joining-adf-
-army&catid=34:news&Itemid=114; All Africa, “Somalia: Ugandan Rebel Group Has Links With Somali 
Militants, a Report Says,” January 5, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201301070015.html. 
13 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
14 Heras, “Ugandan Military Accuses DRC-Based Ugandan Militant Salafist Leader of Complicity in 
Nairobi Mall Attacks.” 
15 U.S. Department of State, “2012 Country Reports on Terrorism,” accessed July 12, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf. 
16 Vision of Humanity, “Global Peace Index 2013,” accessed December 23, 2013, 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/pdf/gpi/2013_Global_Peace_Index_Report.pdf. 
 4 
found DRC to be the least peaceful country, ranked at 156.17 For a long period, the DRC 
has been experiencing violence and a series of struggles by armed groups, especially in 
the east.18  
Despite its ranking, Tanzania has had some events that threaten its peace. For 
example, hate speech has helped to fuel sectarian violence and resulted in church arson, 
persecution of Christian clerics, acid attacks, and bombing attacks.19 The heatmap in 
Figure 2 shows violent events in Tanzania. The island of Zanzibar appears to be the 
hotspot for violence; frequency of violence is based on violent events from 2012 to 2013. 
 
Figure 2.  Violent Hotspots in Tanzania (2012‒2013). Source: Palantir Heatmap. 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 For details, see Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 
2012); Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: 
Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Mwesiga Baregu, (Ed.) Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and 
Strategies in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 2011). 
19 All mentioned events are recent and new occurrences in Tanzania, prompting a suspicion of 
intrusion by terrorists. See the heat map (Figure 2) for violent areas.  
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Moreover, the security cooperation between the United States and East African 
countries to counter terror attacks and Tanzania’s participation in the DRC to quell all 
rebel organizations20 have increased and put the country at risk. According to Rigobert 
Minani-Bihuzo, a Congolese socio-political scholar, “Many of these groups are 
criminally oriented militias seeking to profit from trafficking the region’s natural 
resources.”21 Because of this reason, Tanzania faces potential retaliatory attacks when 
rebel financing is threatened. To get a better gauge on these external actors and the 
threats they pose to Tanzania, we turn to the negative forces operating in the eastern 
DRC.   
1. Illegal Armed Organizations Operating in the Eastern DRC 
In October 2013, the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)22 and the 
Congolese Army conducted a counterinsurgency operation in the eastern DRC. The 
operation successfully defeated the M23 rebel group. However, it is difficult to 
substantiate whether or not this is the end of the eastern DRC conflicts.23 The M23 
leaders and some of its militants have run away into neighboring countries.24 Despite the 
defeat, M23 has yet to disarm. This makes the situation on the ground unpredictable. Past 
events have shown that some armed groups in the eastern DRC, specifically the Tutsi-led 
rebel group, have continued their rebellion despite the signing of a peace treaty and their 
integration into the Congolese National Army.  
                                                 
20 For a number of rebel forces, see Figure 3. 
21 Rigobert Minani-Bihuzo, “Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes,” Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies no. 21 (July, 2012), 1, http://africacenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/AfricaBriefFinal_21.pdf. 
22 On March 28, 2013, under Chapter VII Peace Enforcement, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2098 authorized the creation of the most robust Force Intervention Brigade to repel all illegal 
armed groups from the eastern DRC. The intervention force consists of 3,000 troops from Malawi, South 
Africa, and Tanzania. It is executing its mandate under the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in DRC (MONUSCO). 
23 Stephanie Wolters, “It May Be Too Soon To Celebrate the Defeat of the M23,” November 5, 2013, 
Institute for Security Studies, accessed December 22, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/it-may-be-
too-soon-to-celebrate-the-defeat-of-the-m23. 




Often, the rebel organizations have splintered; they have changed their names and 
leadership, run away with weapons, started a fresh fight against government forces and 
launched violence against unarmed civilians. Unless M23 is completely disarmed, 
subsequent peace agreements have the potential to fail.25 Should the Kampala peace talks 
fail to mediate the Congolese government and M23, it is possible that they could stage a 
comeback at a time of their choosing. Thus, the instability in the eastern DRC will 
continue to present a potential threat to Tanzania. As we see in Figure 3, other armed 
organizations also are roaming the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.  
 
Figure 3.  Illegal Armed Groups in the Eastern DRC.26 
                                                 
25 See the next chapter for a discussion of the failures of various peace agreements. 
26 Christoph Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo,” accessed December 10, 
2013, “ http://christophvogel.net. 
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Figure 3 reflects a cross section of illegal armed organizations operating in the 
eastern DRC as of October 2013.27 There are more than 30 organizations. The notable 
ones are “the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS),”28 “the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),”29 and the “National 
Liberation Forces (FNL).”30 The FDLR and FNL are the Rwandan Hutu rebel group and 
Burundian Hutu-led rebel group, respectively. Moreover, there are other local and/or 
ethnic militia groups like the Mai-Mai.31 These groups were created by indigenous 
Congolese to protect their communities against the aggression of foreign-armed groups, 
especially from Rwanda.32 The Mai-Mai is divided into various factions across the DRC 
(both the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces).33 Some of them have made alliances 
while others operate on their own.34 Other key-armed organizations, not on the map are 
“the Allied for Democratic Forces (ADF)”35 and “the National Army for the Liberation 
of Uganda (NALU).”36 Both the ADF and NALU are Ugandan insurgency organizations. 
Among all these negative forces, the ADF is the focus of this thesis. Apparently, it is the 
only organization that has been alleged to engage in terrorist activities, especially in 
Uganda.37  
                                                 
27 Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo.” 
28 “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Children and Armed Conflict, May 15, 2013, 
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/. 
29 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 61. 
30 MONUSCO, “The Foreign Armed Groups,” United Nations Missions, accessed December 23, 
2013, http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10727&. 
31 United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, “Democratic Republic of the Congo.” 
32 Raise Hope for Congo, “Armed Groups, “accessed December 2, 2013, 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/armed-groups. 
33 For a detailed list of armed groups, see Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern 
Congo.” 
34 Raise Hope for Congo, “Armed Groups.” 
35 MONUSCO, “The Foreign Armed Groups.” 
36 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion,” December 19, 
2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b093-eastern-congo-the-adf-
nalus-lost-rebellion-english. 
37 Ibid., see Chapter III for more reasons. 
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2. The ADF Insurgency 
Origin: The history of the ADF dates back to the late 1980s. Soon after Idi Amin 
was ousted from power, the Ugandan government took severe measures against Muslims 
associated with the Tabligh Muslim movement.38 Later, one of the leaders of the Tabligh 
movement, Jamil Mukulu, converted from Christianity to Islam. He then formed the 
ADF.39 The ADF is a Ugandan Islamist terrorist organization now based in the eastern 
DRC. It became operational in the mid-1990s.40 In 1995, the ADF merged with another 
Ugandan insurgency organization called NALU.41 In 2002, Ugandan forces successfully 
managed to drive the ADF out of Uganda.42 Afterward, it migrated into the eastern DRC 
where it blended with the local population and other armed groups.43 Aside from the 
ADF attacks to delegitimize the Ugandan government, it has failed to topple it.44  
Ideology: The ADF does not appear to have a well-established ideology; it mixes 
radical Islam and ethno-politics.45 The group is empathetic to Ugandan Muslims46 and 
the Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda.47 The ADF’s overall objective is to depose the 
Ugandan government and supersede it with an Islamic regime.48 However, the chance of 
doing so seems to be minimal because it has failed to operate in Uganda since 2007.49  
The group’s main goal is emancipation of the Ugandan people from the perceived threat 
of Rwandese Tutsis’ domination.50  
                                                 
38 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 IHS Jane’s; International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
41 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
42 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
43 Ibid. 
44 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
45 Ibid. 
46 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
47 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
48 Ibid. 
49 International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
50 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
 9 
Organization Structure: The ADF’s strength is believed to be a battalion plus, 
with approximately 1,500 fighters.51 However, the organizational structure shown in 
Figure 4 represents only a cross-section of ADF leadership consisting of 17 members.52  
 
Figure 4.  The ADF Organization Structure. 
As shown in Figure 4, the formal structure appears to be hierarchical. The 
command and control element consists of the following persons. Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, 
who is the politico-military leader, heads the ADF. Mukulu has many aliases, such as 
David Steven, Arilabaki, Musezi Talengelanamiro, Mzee Tutu, Bruno, Kafeero, and 
                                                 
51 Risdel Kasasira, “ADF Operating More than 1,500 Fighters,” The Monitor, July 16, 2013, accessed 
September 23, 2013, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/ADF-operating-with-more-than-1-500-
fighters/-/688334/1916178/-/ykuuo5/-/index.html. 
52 Kasasira, “ADF Operating More than 1,500 Fighters.” 
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Kyagulanyi.53 In addition, Mukulu has numerous passports of different nationalities 
including East African countries and the United Kingdom. He uses them to avoid 
detection.54 Another senior leader is Hood Lukwago; he is an army commander and his 
second in command is Hamis Kashada. The command element oversees the insurgency 
wing and the training wing. The chief political commissar, Musa Baluku, heads the 
political wing. The deputy to Baluku is Abdu Hamid Diru. These are the political 
advisers to Jamil Mukulu. 
Activities: Since it became operational, the ADF has been involved in a wide 
range of activities. The group has conducted armed attacks on civilians’ villages, 
kidnappings, and training of youth to join its forces. The group has also conducted 
bombing attacks aimed to undermine the legitimacy of the Ugandan government.55 
Besides violent events, the ADF is also alleged to engage in counterfeiting, taxation on 
illegal timber production, and taxation on illegal mining.56 
Area of Operations: The map in Figure 5 points out the ADF location in 
“Ruwenzori Mountain ranges of North Kivu province, in eastern DRC.”57 To a large 
extent, its operations have remained along the western Ugandan border with the DRC.58 
Occasionally, the ADF militants cross the border into Uganda to terrorize villagers, 
kidnap youths, and bring them into their base for training.59 
                                                 
53 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” Jamil Mukulu uses aliases to mask his travel. For 
more aliases, read the article by Nicholas A. Heras, “Ugandan Military Accuses DRC-Based Ugandan 
Militant Salafist Leader of Complicity in Nairobi Mall Attacks,” The James Town Foundation, October 31, 
2013. 
54 Giles Muhame, “EXCLUSIVE: DRC Amasses Troops Near ADF Bases,” Chim Reports, November 
26, 2013, accessed December 1, 2013, http://chimpreports.com/index.php/mobile/news/14474-exclusive-
drc-amasses-troops-near-adf-bases.html. 
55 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Chapter IV for the heatmap showing various activities conducted by the ADF. 
59 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
 11 
 
Figure 5.  The ADF Area of Operations 2002‒2013. Source: Google. 
The organization mainly operates on the western Ugandan border with DRC.60 Its 
headquarters is located at Makayoba, Eringeti sector, in North Kivu Province.61 Its 
training camp is in the Isale Sector in Mwalika.62 For a decade or so the ADF’s 
operational impetus has been considerably low. During this time, its activities have been 
widely linked with the exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC.63 However, 
towards the end of 2013, ADF appears to have stepped up its activities. For example, the 
group attacked unarmed civilians in a town called Kamango in eastern Congo. The attack 
led to a refugee influx in Uganda. About 60,000 fled to eastern Uganda.64   
 
                                                 
60 Kasasira, “ADF operating more than 1,500 fighters.” 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
64 Aljazeera, “Congolese Influx to Uganda Reaches 60,000,” July 15, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/201371410175504702.html. 
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The ADF’s Funding Sources: During its early years, the ADF used to obtain 
funding from Khartoum (Sudan). However, that aid was cut off after Uganda and Sudan 
normalized their relations.65 Now it has established financial support cells across the East 
Africa and Europe. In East Africa, the ADF raises its funds in the Eastleigh suburb of 
Nairobi (Kenya), the port city of Tanga (Tanzania), Hutu communities in Bujumbura 
(Burundi) and Kigali (Rwanda).66 The ADF also receives finances from its members and 
sympathizers in London and Northern Ireland.67 In addition, the ADF generates its funds 
from established businesses in Beni territory, North Kivu province.68  
How ADF Entered the Eastern DRC: In their book Ungoverned Territories: 
Understanding and Reducing Terrorism, Angel Rabasa and others define “ungoverned 
territory as an area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control … 
[which] can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or 
areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not 
extend.”69 Rabasa and Peters posit, “In an ungoverned territory, the state is not the 
primary source of authority.”70  This definition precisely fits the situation in eastern 
DRC, the under-governed region—presence of security forces and law-enforcement 
agencies has been observed to be minimal in the Congo’s east compared to other areas.71 
A sense of insecurity has influenced some civilians in the eastern part of DRC to turn to 
rebel groups for protection. The area also has provided a favorable environment for the 
emergence of illegal armed groups including the ADF. These groups commit violent 
crimes on noncombatants; they kill civilians, rape women, impose illegal taxation, and 
loot civilian property. Some of the armed groups went further to provoke questioning the 
                                                 
65 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
66 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF);” United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group 
on Somalia and Eritrea,” July 13, 2012, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544. 
67 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
68 Ibid. 
69 Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D.P. 
Moroney, Kevin A. O’Brien, and John E. Peter, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing 
Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), xv. 
70 Angel Rabasa and John E. Peters, “Dimensions of Ungovernability,” in Ungoverned Territories: 
Understanding and Reducing Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 7‒8. 
71 Rabasa, et al., Ungoverned Territories, xv. 
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legitimacy of the Congolese government. For instance, before it was vanquished, M23 
sought to overthrow the government of the DRC. After its defeat in 2002, the group took 
refuge in the eastern DRC, an area that has been an epicenter of civil wars since 1996. 
The ADF has exploited the ungoverned space, which enabled it to establish a base from 
which to continue its rebellion against the Ugandan government.72   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the potential threat of ADF to the national 
security of Tanzania. If a threat is found, the thesis will explore what alternative 
strategies could be crafted to avert these threats.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer a major research question: How can the United 
Republic of Tanzania protect itself from the potential spillover effect of the ADF 
insurgency in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo? In order to answer the 
central question, minor questions have to be addressed first:  
1. What is the ADF insurgency network and how does it operate? 
2. To what extent does the ADF insurgency network pose a security threat to 
Tanzania? 
D. A PREVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY 
This thesis conducted a descriptive study to make a threat assessment of the ADF 
insurgency network. The thesis employed visual analytic techniques (link, geospatial, 
temporal analysis, and social network analyses) to examine open-source data. A detailed 
description of the methodology is described in Chapter III. 
E. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
This thesis comprises seven chapters. A synopsis of the Congolese conflicts is 
provided in the second chapter. The chapter traces how historical patterns have helped to 
create a vicious cycle of conflicts and recurring violence in the eastern DRC. Multiple 
                                                 
72 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
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drivers seem to come into play. The second chapter also addresses outcomes of civil wars 
in the Congo, failures in various peace agreements, and the current development 
regarding the conflict in the eastern Congo. 
The third chapter provides readers an opportunity to understand the methodology 
used to carry out the study. The chapter presents how the visual analytics tools were used 
to gain insight and to illuminate the ADF insurgency network.  
To better understand the network, the fourth chapter analyzes structured data 
obtained from open sources to uncover patterns of the ADF network. It has four sections: 
link analysis, geospatial analysis, temporal analysis, and social network analysis.  
The fifth chapter discusses the findings from the previous chapter and their 
interpretations.  
The sixth chapter presents proposed strategies to disrupt the ADF insurgency 
network. Finally, the seventh chapter concludes the thesis and provides 
recommendations, and focusing on the results, proposes a key strategy and areas for 
further research. 
In addition, there is a codebook in the appendix to thesis.73 This is a tool used for 
visual analytics to define various entities, their links, and relationships as well as events 
and their locations on the earth’s surface. The codebook facilitated the tagging process—
transformation of unstructured data into structured data ready for analysis. The codebook 
is easy to use. Under the objects column, for instance, when we create an entity, a 
terrorist organization (e.g., the ADF), we specify the location of this organization. Then 
we create another entity, for example, people. Next, these people presumably have links 
with the ADF, so the link type must be chosen from the links column and be established 
between those people and the ADF. If they are terrorists, then they could be members of 
the ADF or they associate with it. 
Events are also created in the same way; for example, if the ADF conducted 
armed attacks, the location should be known and recorded—the location is geo-tagged 
                                                 
73 In an attempt to illuminate dark networks, the codebook was developed by the Common Operational 
Research Environment (CORE) Lab at the United States Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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using longitude and latitude. Then, the ADF must be linked with such attacks by 
establishing a link showing the ADF actually perpetrated the attacks. The exercise 
continues until all entities (people and organizations), events, location, etc., have been 
tagged.  
In the end, a big picture about the ADF emerges. It reveals information like its 
location, conducted events, its members and leadership, who are the most influential 
persons in its network, organizations collaborating with the ADF, etc.  
 16 
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II. THE CONGOLESE CONFLICTS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
In every conflict a certain event triggers the initiation of a struggle. 
—Ho-Won Jeong 
 
In general, ungovernability is driving instability in the eastern DRC; it has helped 
to create a suitable environment for illegal armed groups, both local and foreign, to 
flourish. These rebel groups not only destabilize the Congo’s east, they also threaten the 
national security of neighboring states. In an attempt to understand how ungovernability 
has destabilized the security of the eastern part of the DRC, this chapter presents key 
drivers. In the first section, we present key factors behind instability in the eastern DRC. 
The second part presents past peace agreements and their challenges. The third section 
describes the rebellion of the M23, and the fourth section outlines the effects of civil wars 
in the DRC. Drawing on this historical foundation, strategies can then be developed to 
assist the Tanzanian government in responding to these insurgencies and terrorist attacks.  
A. DRIVERS OF THE CONGOLESE CONFLICTS 
More factors might be motivating the protracted conflicts in the eastern DRC, but 
the key drivers are the colonial legacy, manipulation of ethnic differences, spillover of 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and interference of regional actors. Other drivers are state 
failure and the international peace-building culture.74 Some of the drivers are interwoven 
with each other as will be explained in the following sections. 
                                                 
74 For detailed accounts, see Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (New York, NY: 
Public Affairs, 2012); Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of 
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World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mwesiga Baregu, (Ed.) Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, 
Interests, and Strategies in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 2011). 
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1. Colonial Legacy: Divide-and-Rule Tactic (1908‒1960) 
The first driver emanates from colonialism.75 In his book, Africa’s World War: 
Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, Gérard 
Prunier suggests that before colonization, boundaries that existed in Africa were based on 
tribes, clans, and to a lesser extent, by monarchies.76 In spite of that, during the colonial 
period, the African continent was demarcated according to the interests of European 
colonialists mostly from Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Portugal. 
The colonial administrative borderlines did not take into account ethnic groups residing 
in the border regions. For example, before colonization, the tribes of the Luo, Kurya, and 
Masaai people occupied the same region between Kenya and Tanzania. When British 
colonists created borders between these two countries, they split the region where these 
people lived. Even today people from these tribes can be found in Kenya and Tanzania.  
Presumably, before colonization, Banyarwanda people (Hutu and Tutsi) lived in 
the border between the eastern DRC (formerly Zaire) and Western Rwanda. Both DRC 
and Rwanda were under the colonial power of Belgium. According to Prunier, in the 
1930s, the Belgians established “the Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB)” 
that facilitated the relocation of more than 100,000 Rwandan people to the Kivu 
provinces to cultivate arable land and to work in the mining sector. The majority of these 
people were Hutus.77 The movement program not only supplied laborers, but also 
relieved Rwanda of demographic pressure, as it was already a densely populated colony. 
Nonetheless, like many colonialists elsewhere, the Belgians employed a divide-and-rule 
tactic. They treated Rwandan immigrants in DRC as noncitizens.78 At the same time, 
they offered them leadership positions in the local administration.79 Next, the colonialists 
                                                 
75 Roger Kibasomba and Thadee Barega Lombe, “Obstacles to Post-Election Peace in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo: Actors, Interests and Strategies,” in Understanding Obstacles to Peace: 
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76 Prunier, Africa’s World War, xxiv. 
77 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 48; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 133; Stearns, Dancing in 
the Glory of Monsters, 71‒72. 
78 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 134. 
79 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 134. 
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degraded the powers of local chiefs to manage land. As immigrants, the Banyarwanda 
desired the right to obtain their own land. Eventually, they were given these rights in 
accordance with traditional customs.80 This did not give them right to own land 
indefinitely.81 The Belgians continued to favor people with Rwandan origin. Afterward, 
they continued to offer them administrative positions, which they used to prosper in all 
spheres of life.82 Later, the Banyarwanda persuaded the colonial power to offer them area 
autonomy so that they could govern themselves though the colonialists denied them total 
entitlement.83 The colonial power feared that the same demand would escalate to other 
areas and soon it would lose oversight of its colony.84 With dim prospects and a feeling 
of being marginalized by the colonial system, the Congolese natives began to retaliate 
against the non-native Rwandan immigrants.85  
2. Manipulation of Ethnic Differences  
The second driver is manipulation of ethnic differences. It was a politically 
activated ethnic violence. It was purposely done as a currency for political capital. 
Instead of resolving the conflict between indigenous Congolese and immigrants from 
Rwanda, political leaders in Zaire used the confrontation for political gain. This occurred 
during the post-colonial period. Roger Kibasomba and Thadee Barega Lombe associate 
these acts with “the legacies of the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila.”86 Problem started when 
the eastern Zaire received other immigrants from Rwanda. This was after the Congo 
gained independence from Belgium in 1960. These included about 60,000 Tutsi who fled 
Rwanda into Congo’s east. They ran away in fear of persecution by Hutu ethnic groups 
during the struggle for independence in Rwanda. Some analysts call this the “second 
                                                 
80 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 49. 
81 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 49; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 61. 
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wave” of the Rwandan immigrants into eastern DRC territory.87 Later, more people from 
Rwanda were brought into North Kivu province.88 The political elite of Rwandan descent 
who provided safe passage of these people administered the relocation exercise.89 This 
was an attempt to consolidate superiority of Rwandese people there.90 The subsequent 
arrival of refugees and other immigrants changed the relations between the natives and 
descendants of Rwandan immigrants from bad to worse. Eastern Zaire started to 
experience demographic pressure, as well. In 1963, local conflicts were heightened. As a 
result, thousands of Rwandan-Congolese were killed in North Kivu.91 Gradually, 
conflicts started to brew between the community level and the national level.92 For 
instance, in 1964, the issue of nationality surfaced in Congolese politics. At that time, the 
right to citizenship was given only to people who settled in the DRC before the colonial 
period in 1908.93 All immigrants who came after the colonial period were refused 
citizenship. The denial created grievances among Rwandan-Congolese people. 
As time progressed, the indigenous Congolese continued to struggle for political 
power and land initially owned by the Banyarwanda.94 In order to neutralize dissidents, 
the late President Mobutu encouraged immigration of Tutsi cattle herdsmen into Zaire.95 
The arrival of cattle herders exerted more pressure on land, which indigenous 
agriculturalists used to grow crops. Eventually, tension emerged between them. Both 
ethnic groups had to compete for the same piece of land for cultivation and cattle 
keeping.96 
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Moreover, throughout history, the eastern part was more resistant to the 
Congolese government than other regions in the DRC—specifically in North Kivu.97 In 
order to weaken his opponents, Mobutu gave the Banyarwanda people high-ranking 
political positions.98 Again, they used these positions to acquire more land, as well as 
economic prosperity.99 After they had established themselves, they used political 
influence to forge an agenda—to be legally recognized as Congolese citizens.100 They 
pushed their agenda within Mobutu regime. In due course, all Rwandans who had lived in 
the Congo after independence were given Congolese citizenship.101 In reaction to this, 
the indigenous Congolese struggled to amend the law. The amendment nullified the 
previous law of 1972.102 Citizenship was given only to people who could provide 
evidence to substantiate that they had lived in the Congo before the colonial period.103 In 
another development, the elite Congolese went further to prohibit Rwandan immigrants 
from being represented in the parliament.104 This was an attempt to degrade their social 
and political power. Moreover, Congolese politicians swapped local administration in 
North Kivu province. Native Congolese retained leadership role.105 Meanwhile, those 
with Rwandan ancestry started to fight in order to preserve their power. 
In addition to manipulating ethnic differences, Mobutu plundered the wealth of 
Zaire. Initially, he used to enjoy the support from the West. Although the country had 
abundant mineral resources, its economy was highly dependent on foreign aid. However, 
soon after the Cold War ended, foreign aid was cut off. Subsequently, the economy of the 
country was weakened, and domestic opposition emerged.106 Not only that, Mobutu was 
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also under pressure for democratization.107 He tried to undertake political reforms in 
1990 by legalizing opposition parties.108 However, there was no sincere commitment in 
making considerable changes. He also failed to revive the economy of Zaire and to bring 
peace and unity in the country. This marked the beginning of the end for his regime. To 
continue stay in power, Mobutu had to do something. He opted for a laissez-faire style of 
leadership. He allowed his military troops to find their own resources for sustainment.109 
As the opposition became strong in the eastern part of Zaire, Mobutu manipulated ethnic 
differences between the indigenous Congolese and non-indigenous Congolese of 
Rwandan origin.110 This time, he switched sides. He brought back the controversial issue 
concerning nationality.111 The contention regarding who is a Congolese triggered long-
standing hostility. Again, indigenous communities started to clash with communities of 
Rwandan origin.112 Additionally, Mobutu signed a decree to revoke the citizenship of 
people of Rwandan origin.113 He then ordered them to go back to Rwanda.114 He 
switched sides to minimize the chance of being ousted from power by his own people.115  
In sum, as Autesserre notes, competition over land and political power played a 
great part in aggravating local violence in the Kivu provinces.116 This led to killings of 
the Hutus and Tutsi dwellers.117 Then the massacres escalated to South Kivu province. In 
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the end, rampant violence in the eastern DRC drove the elite of Rwandan descendants to 
collaborate with neighboring states to oust Mobutu from power.118  
3. Spillover Effect of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide into Congolese 
Territory 
The third driver is the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The massacre completely 
changed the dynamics of the Congolese conflicts. The dynamics of the conflicts started to 
change after about two million Rwandan Hutu refugees crossed into North Kivu province 
and South Kivu province.119 These people were in three groups: noncombatants, ex-
soldiers of the defeated Hutu-led Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), and the Hutu militias 
known as Interahamwe. The Hutu soldiers and Hutu militiamen orchestrated the genocide 
against Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Then, they fled to escape retaliation from the 
Rwandan government led by the Tutsi.120 The arrival of Hutus in the eastern DRC 
changed the dynamics of the conflict from a local level to the regional level.121 It also 
dramatically changed the interrelations between the communities residing in eastern 
DRC. The atmosphere got worse when Congolese politicians started to advance their 
political agenda by publicizing their hatred of Tutsi ethnic groups.122 As time went by, 
Hutu militants and refugees found themselves with no means to survive. So they 
reorganized themselves into various armed groups and incited violence, looting, and 
conducted cross-border attacks against the new Rwandan government with the aim to 
overthrow it.123 Moreover, Jason K. Stearns asserts that the exiled Hutu extremists vowed 
to continue attacking the Tutsi until they completely exterminated them.124 On the other  
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side, the new Rwandan government pressed Mobutu to demilitarize refugee camps, 
segregate the génocidaires from civilians, and to disarm. Unfortunately, Rwandan 
demands were not put into effect.125 
The subsequent incursion of Hutu militia into Rwandan territory led to the first 
Congo War, which occurred from 1996 to 1997.126 In this war, soldiers from neighboring 
countries and local militias formed the rebel group called “the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo-Zaïre, AFDL).”127 The AFDL rebelled against Mobutu, who 
allegedly supported the exiled Hutu extremists in the east.128 The population discontent 
with Mobutu was on the other side, supporting the rebel movement. Communities in the 
east reacted differently, as the indigenous and the Tutsi communities mobilized to kill 
each other.129 In the end, Mobutu was overthrown. Next, the rebel leader Laurent Désiré 
Kabila (Senior) took over power and changed the country’s name from Zaire to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.130  
In 1998, Kabila made a strategic error contrary to the expectations of his 
partners.131 He was accused of the following allegations: supporting the Hutu rebel 
group, questioning the nationality of people with Rwandan origins, and firing Tutsi ethnic 
civil servants.132 In retaliation, his former allies established a new rebel group known as 
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“the (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD).”133 The RCD comprised of ex-combatants 
of AFDL. This group was created to pursue the Hutu-led rebel group “the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, 
FDLR).”134 The FDLR is a replica of the Hutu dominated Rwandan Armed Forces 
(FAR) that participated in the genocide.135 
The creation of RCD set the stage for the second Congo War.136 The war paved 
the way for Uganda and Rwanda to invade the DRC. This was seen as an act of self-
defense against the negative forces in the eastern DRC posing security threats to Ugandan 
and Rwandan sovereignty, respectively. The war also drew in other countries, such as 
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia. They went in to support Kabila.137   
However, the RCD failed to topple Kabila. In 1998, another rebel force was 
formed to resist Kabila. It was known as “the Congo Liberation Movement (Mouvement 
pour la Libération du Congo, MLC).”138 In 1999, Rwandan and Ugandan troops attacked 
each other in the eastern DRC.139 This event was associated with the hoarding of 
competitive areas of mineral wealth.140 However, Ugandan forces did not pull out from 
eastern DRC. Instead, it sided with the MLC.141 Broken partnerships between Ugandan 
and Rwandan forces led to the creation of two factions: RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda, 
                                                 
133 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 48. 
134 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Peace Talks in Eastern DRC Face Uncertain 
Outcome,” March 13, 2013, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2013-
a8b5/peace-talks-in-eastern-drc-face-uncertain-outcome-0dd9. 
135 Ibid. 
136 James Dobbins et.al, Overcoming Obstacles to Peace; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, 
8, 195. 
137 Curtis, “Raison d’État Unleashed: Understanding Rwanda’s Foreign Policy in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo;” Jeong, Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis, 125; Institute for Security 
Studies, “The Peace Process in the DRC,” 
http://www.iss.org.za/AF/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/fulldoc.pdf. 
138 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 48. 
139 Ibid., 48. 
140 Ibid., 48. 
141 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 48; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 281; Curtis, “Raison 
d’État Unleashed: Understanding Rwanda’s Foreign Policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” 
 26 
on one hand and RCD-Kisangani supported by Uganda.142 On the other hand, Laurent 
Kabila did not stay long in power. He was assassinated in 2001.143 Then, his son Joseph 
Kabila (Junior) succeeded him.144 The Second Congo War officially ended in 2003.145 
Democratic elections were conducted in 2006. Joseph Kabila had won the presidency.146 
Unfortunately, violence and fighting continued to surface in the Congo’s east.147 
4. State Failure 
The fourth driver fueling the Congolese conflicts is the state failure caused by 
institutional weakness. It has its roots in the colonial legacy as well. The colonialists 
created extractive institutions to exploit Congo’s wealth and did little to improve social 
services. When Mobutu took over power, he copied the same colonial system of 
governance: his government was authoritarian; he plundered mineral resources; he 
weakened the military for fear of a coup d’état; and he placed key institutions under his 
control and that of his closest allies. This made institutions incapable of serving the 
public.148 
It is only the state that has the legitimate use of force. Here, James Dobbins and 
others consider state institutions in the DRC to be weak and consequently unable to 
provide basic services,149 for instance, security and control of its territory.150 So when the 
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Congolese government failed to protect its citizens, people turned to local militias for 
protection. Equally important, Robert I. Rotberg notes “there is no failed state without 
disharmonies between (haves and have-nots) communities.”151 That is why there is 
continued struggle and competition among ethnic groups in the Congo’s east. The have-
nots are struggling to get something, while the haves are struggling to continue 
dominating the have-nots. 
In summary, the DRC exhibits some attributes of a failed state. The absence of 
state authority in the eastern DRC has created a vacuum. This situation favored the 
emergence of illegal armed groups.152 These rebel groups were able to take advantage of 
the power vacuum that exists in the ungoverned space.153  
5. Interference of Regional Actors 
The fifth driver is interference of regional actors. Here the state weakness may 
also motivate the incursion of neighboring states to exploit that opportunity for their own 
benefit. Rabasa and Peters assert, “a neighboring state—exerts control over the domestic 
political and economic space within a state or prevents a government from asserting 
control over that space.”154 Likewise, Autesserre believes that the invasion of 
neighboring countries in the DRC in 1996 was attributed to both security and economic 
reasons. She argues that some of the regional states lack strong political will to end the 
conflicts in the eastern DRC because of “geopolitical interests and geo-economics 
interests.”155 Jeong, Kibasomba, and Lombe confirm this. They all argue that 
neighboring countries exploited DRC internal conflicts in order to expand their sphere of 
influence and advance economic interests.”156  
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6. International Peace-Building Culture 
The sixth driver is the international peace-building culture. Autesserre’s findings 
show that another source of conflict in the eastern DRC emanates from the international 
peace-building culture practiced by international institutions. Such agencies tend to focus 
more on macro issues at the regional and the national levels, while they give less weight 
to micro issues. Neglecting to confront localized causes of violence has remained one of 
the contributors to the ongoing conflict in the region. Here, the international community 
takes the position that the Congolese government is the one responsible for its domestic 
affairs.157 To resolve this top-down dilemma, Autesserre recommends a combination of 
two strategies: the bottom-up approach to mitigating local grievances and a top-bottom 
approach to address issues at the national level. With this approach, she believes the 
communities in eastern DRC will eventually be influenced to coexist with others.158 In 
addition, she makes the following assertion: 
During the Congolese transition, while foreign peacebuilders succeeded in 
imposing settlements at both the regional and national levels, they failed to 
establish one at the subnational level. Throughout the eastern Congo, 
bottom-up rivalries played a decisive role in sustaining local, national, and 
regional violence after the conflict officially ended. These agendas pitted 
villagers, traditional chiefs, community chiefs, or ethnic leaders against 
one another over the distribution of land, the exploitation of local mining 
sites, the appointment to local administrative and traditional positions of 
authority, the collection of taxes, and the relative social status of specific 
groups and individuals.159 
Dobbins concurs with this assessment; he notes that the international peace-
building strategy in the Congo did not focus on Congolese socio-cultural issues, but 
instead placed its emphasis on national elections, security, and economic stabilization. 
Matters related to ethnic, tribal, and land disputes in the east were never addressed.160  
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Thus, neglecting local grievances is like dealing with symptoms while leaving the root 
cause of problems unresolved. In turn, local issues act as a flame, which ignite fires at the 
national and regional level. 
B. PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR CHALLENGES 
At the end of the first Congo War, a number of peace agreements were made. 
This section presents these peace agreements and their difficulties. 
1. Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999  
The Lusaka ceasefire agreement of 1999 brought all the countries involved in the 
second Congo War to the “cease-fire agreement,” which was signed in July 1999.161 The 
DRC itself, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda were the participating 
countries.162 However, in August 2000, the cease-fire agreement collapsed and fighting 
resumed. The fights were renewed due to the failure of the Congolese government to deal 
with insurgents threatening the security of Rwanda and Uganda.163 
2. Pretoria Agreement of July 2002 
The failure of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement of 1999 led South Africa in 2002 to 
initiate another peace agreement.164 The peace deal arranged for Rwandan troops to 
withdraw from the DRC and the Hutu-led rebel group to disarm. The agreement was to 
prepare for a transition government.165 In this agreement, only two rebel groups were 
represented: the MLC and RCD-Goma group. Another rebel group, like the Mai-Mai 
group, was left out of the agreement. Initially, the Pretoria agreement faced difficulties 
and the brokered peace deal nearly collapsed. The agreement faced difficulties because 
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the neighborhood-backed insurgency rejected the deal.166 The rebels disagreed on power 
sharing. They disagreed with being given low ranks after they were integrated into the 
Congolese Army. They also disapproved of the presidency of Joseph Kabila. They 
claimed that he continued to support the Hutu insurgency in the eastern DRC.167 So they 
wanted him to step down from power.168 After many efforts of persuasion, eventually the 
RCD-Goma agreed to sign the power sharing agreement on July 30, 2002. It appears that 
the group’s representatives were discontent because the agreement did not serve many of 
their interests.169  
3. Luanda Agreement of 2002 
Consequently, in September 2002, another peace agreement was signed. The 
agreement was between the Ugandan and Congolese governments. The Luanda 
agreement appears to be similar to the Pretoria agreement. It was brokered to facilitate 
the withdrawal of all foreign armies from the Congo’s east.170 To a great extent, both the 
Pretorian Agreement and the Luanda Agreement were successful in some ways because 
foreign armies withdrew their troops from the eastern DRC. However, some of the very 
same countries that signed the peace agreements were later alleged to support the 
insurgency against the Congolese government. Hence rebellion in opposition to the 
Congolese government and violence against civilians continued to destabilize the region. 
4. Peace Deal of 2003 
In 2003, the DRC adopted a new constitution. This laid down the foundation for 
democratic elections. Joseph Kabila became the first democratically elected president. 
Despite the political turning point, the situation in the North Kivu province in eastern 
Congo was still fragile as rebel groups continued to fight each other and attack innocent 
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civilians.171 In the end, the RCD-Goma resented again being isolated from power sharing 
during the transition to peace. In retaliation, the rebel leader General Laurent Nkunda 
refused to comply with the peace agreement. Then he engineered another rebel group 
called the “National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP).”172 This group 
continued rebellion against the Congolese government.173 
5. Goma Peace Agreement of 2008 
As the turbulence of violence and instability continued, another effort was made 
to resolve the eastern DRC conflicts. The Congolese government, the CNDP, and Mai-
Mai militias signed the Goma peace agreement in 2008, to end fighting in the eastern 
DRC. Among other things, the agreement clearly pointed out that militants of the CNDP 
rebel group would not be prosecuted. The group would also be allowed to engage in 
political activities.174 However, the Goma peace agreement did not completely resolve 
the conflicts in the eastern DRC. This led to another peace deal, the Goma peace accord 
in 2009. 
6. Goma Peace Accord of 2009 
On the one hand, part of the terms of the Goma Peace Accord required the 
Rwandan government to apprehend and hand over CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda to the 
Congolese government.175 On the other hand, the Congolese government had to allow 
deployment of Rwandan forces in eastern DRC to clear the Hutu insurgency group.176 
Later, General Bosco Ntaganda assumed the leadership of the CNDP. It was after Laurent 
Nkunda was nabbed in Rwanda.177 In March 2009, Ntaganda signed a peace deal with 
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the DRC government, in which the CNDP militants were to be integrated into the 
Congolese Army.178 Later, they were integrated into the army. However, they mutinied 
and formed another group called the M23. 
C. THE REBELLION OF THE M23 
The rebellion of the M23 started in May 2012.179 The M23, or Movement 23, is a 
reformation of the CNDP.180 The group was created out of grievances and the failure of 
the Congolese government to honor the March 23, 2009 Goma peace agreement, which 
was signed to integrate them into the Congolese National Army. M23 again took up arms 
and started to fight the Congolese National Army. They succeeded in seizing Goma, the 
capital of North Kivu province.181 After they captured Goma, the rebels conducted 
violence against civilians. On several occasions, they fought the Congolese Army to 
coerce the government of DRC to give in to their demands. On March 18, 2013, the rebel 
leader of M23, Ntaganda, was apprehended and later transferred to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Then Sultan Makange assumed leadership of the group.182 He 
continued to lead the fight of M23 against the Congolese government. Nevertheless, M23 
was defeated at the end of October 2013 by the joint operation conducted by the United 
Nations Force Intervention Brigade and the Congolese Army.183 
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D. EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED CIVIL WARS IN THE EASTERN DRC 
The Congolese conflicts are said to be “Africa’s first World War.”184 The 
aftermath of civil wars has led to the loss of life of more than five million people.185 The 
deaths have been attributed to war and other associated factors such as hunger and 
diseases.186 The war has caused over two million internally displaced people187 and led 
about 70,000 people to flee to the neighboring countries of Rwanda and Uganda.188  
Indeed, the by-product of colonial governance in the eastern DRC set the 
communities of indigenous Congolese and individuals of Rwandese descent into conflict. 
Even worse, after the country had obtained its independence, its political leaders failed to 
resolve ethnic differences and build national unity. Instead, they chose to govern by 
manipulating the very same ethnic differences. Therefore, animosity exacerbated hatred 
between the two communities. For fear of losing land and power, indigenous people 
clashed with Rwandese Congolese. Again, the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
changed completely conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC. Neighboring states intervened 
for self-defense. However, it turned out not to be the only reason for intervention. If the 
Congolese Army had been strong, then the invasion of foreign armies would not have 
been possible.  
Other factors driving instability in the eastern DRC include state failure. The lack 
of ability of the state to protect its citizens enabled rebel groups, who claimed to protect 
them. Some of the armed groups challenged the legitimacy of the Congolese government. 
Furthermore, the international peace-building culture in some ways also contributed to 
prolonged conflicts. The institutionalized culture mainly dealt with problems at the macro  
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level while micro issues were left untouched often leading to a recurrence of violence. 
Thus, unresolved violence at local level had a tendency to exacerbate conflicts at regional 
and national levels.  
In sum, all of these factors interacted to produce an ungoverned area, which paved 
the way for the illegal armed organizations such as the ADF to operate. Before exploring 
the ADF in greater detail, Chapter Three summarizes the methodology used to analyze 
the ADF network.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research is to see what everybody else has seen and to think what nobody else 
has thought. 
—Albert Szent-Gyorgyi 
This chapter presents the study designed to answer the research questions as they 
were stated in Chapter I. Once the research questions were identified, the next step was to 
collect unstructured data from various sources. Next, the unstructured data were 
transformed into a structured format. The transformation of unstructured data to 
structured format permits data analysis in Chapter IV.  
A. THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
Population: According to Christina Prell, “A network boundary … refers to the 
boundary around a set of study,”189 which may include a target population of interest.190 
In this thesis, the population was confined to all organizations found to have direct links 
or indirect links with the ADF terrorist organization.  
Selection Criteria: All rebel groups in the eastern DRC threaten the security of the 
countries that they oppose. However, the researcher selected the ADF insurgency 
network—specifically due to the following facts:  
 First, the ADF is the only officially recognized terrorist organization 
operating in the eastern DRC.191  
 Second, the ADF has been linked with international terrorist 
organizations.192 These ties pose a security threat to the African Great 
Lakes Region, including Tanzania. 
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 Third, it is fair to suggest that the decision of Tanzania to send its troops 
into the eastern DRC to flush out illegal armed organizations makes it 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In fact, these organizations may subvert 
Tanzania’s peace effort in the DRC. Therefore, there is a need to conduct 
threat assessments and determine whether the ADF threat exists. 
B. SOURCES OF DATA 
Raw data were collected from open-source literature. The sources of data included 
books, the Internet, terrorist databases, the United Nations Expert reports, media reports, 
Google news, and online journals. The gathered data then were transformed to facilitate 
data analysis. 
C. VISUAL ANALYTICS PROCEDURES 
1. Data Structuring 
The transformation process began by importing the “unstructured data” or “plain-
text documents” into visual analytic software (Palantir application) for data structuring 
purposes.193 Data structuring means unstructured data were converted into a format that 
allowed the computer program to perform visual analysis.194 In Palantir terminology, the 
structuring process is called tagging. By tagging, we mean extracting relevant pieces of 
information from an unstructured document and transforming that information into data. 
In other words, the tagging process is the means by which we build out our data set by 
creating entities, such as people, places and things, along with event entities. Moreover, 
tagging allows the user to establish relationships among the various entities—people-to-
people, people-to-organization, organization-to-organization, and entities to events 
(people to events, and organizations to events).195 The subsequent step was to visualize 
and analyze the structured data using the visual analytic technique. 
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2. Visual Analytics Techniques 
To better understand the ADF insurgency network, four methodologies were 
employed: link analysis, geospatial analysis, temporal analysis, and social network 
analysis (SNA). Palantir software was used for the first three. Then, Organizational Risk 
Analyzer (ORA) software and UCINET software were used for the SNA part. A 
description of each methodology is offered as follows: 
Link Analysis: Link analysis is a visual analysis method that permitted the 
researcher to build a network of all entities (people and organizations) connected to the 
ADF and to each other. This step provided an opportunity to continue interrogating the 
data in order to find answers to research questions.196 Populating link diagrams from the 
data was a good starting point before conducting detailed analysis. The visualization 
allowed interconnectedness between entities to be seen beforehand. 
Geospatial Analysis: Geospatial analysis is a tool used to place events on a map. 
According to Andy Mitchell, the renowned geospatial analyst, geospatial analysis assists 
decision makers to take a course of action on a particular geographic location. Normally, 
this is a place that has been shown to have concentration of events.197 Palantir software 
enabled all data points related to a particular area of study to be displayed on a heatmap 
in order to identify and compare areas afflicted by violent events.198 Examples of 
geospatial data are violent events in Tanzania, the ADF’s area of operations, and violent 
activities that the group has conducted at various locations, within and outside the borders 
of eastern DRC.  
Temporal Analysis: Temporal analysis was applied to study all events that took 
place over time.199 These were the ADF’s offensive operations and counterinsurgency 
operations conducted by Ugandan and DRC security forces in order to thwart the ADF’s 
offensive.  
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Social Network Analysis: The portion of social network analysis (SNA) helped to 
explore central actors, potential key players, and potential brokers, based on Ron Burt’s 
constraint measure and based on cutpoint analysis.200 In this section, SNA used another 
measure of cohesive subgroup analysis. It examined organizations with relatively close 
association. The final analysis could dictate an intervention strategy.201 In order to 
identify influential actors, social network analysis of the ADF combined network-
evaluated centrality of actors at two levels: the organizational level and individual level. 
Here, four measures of centrality were computed: degree, closeness, betweenness, and 
eigenvector. These metrics were useful in locating a central actor—person or 
organization—that appears to have social power by virtue of the actor’s position within 
the network.202 ORA and UCINET software were used to perform a detailed social 
network analysis. Before visualization was performed, the data were coded, structured, 
and exported from Palantir software into previously mentioned SNA software.  
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The findings in this thesis study were limited by the research design. This is due 
to the boundary set around the ADF terrorist organization. Thus, data coding was done 
based on entities and events that only sought to provide answers to the stipulated research 
questions. The study ignored unrelated items to the questions. This may have obscured 
hidden patterns in the network, yet to be discovered and analyzed.  
Moreover, this thesis relied on data obtained from open data sources only. To a 
great extent, overreliance on these sources may have prevented the researcher from 
obtaining more insight into the ADF because of the incompleteness of social network 
data. For example, there were little relational data to link people to people. This limited 
the creation of meaningful ties between them. As a result, the data analysis highly 
depended on relationships between organizations. For example, incomplete information 
was observed in the link diagram (Figure 7)—specifically, the financial support cells. The 
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graph does not indicate resource flow (from person-to-person or organization-to-
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
I have no special talents. I am only passionately curious. 
—Albert Einstein 
The chapter contains two parts. The first part covers link analysis, geospatial 
analysis, and temporal analysis. The second portion focuses on SNA. It analyzes social 
network data and utilizes measures of centrality, cohesive subgroups, key players, and 
structural holes. Throughout the thesis, the analysis was based on the aggregated social 
network data. This is because individual networks could not furnish meaningful 
information. The overall findings are discussed in Chapter V.  
A. VISUAL ANALYTICS 
Figure 6 shows a total of 32 organizational entities that were tagged in the 
aggregated ADF network. These organizations are of a different nature. They range from 
academic organizations, terrorist organizations, insurgency organizations, criminal 




Figure 6.  Palantir Histogram of Entities in Aggregated ADF Network. 
Of all the entities displayed in Figure 6, fourteen were coded as insurgency 
organizations. The majority of them fall under the Mai-Mai organization (Mai-Mai 
Nyakiliba, Sheka, Raia Mutomboki, the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Resistance Nationale 
Congolaise, Mai-Mai Kirikicho, Mai-Mai Fujo, and the Patriotic Alliance for a Free and 
Sovereign Congo).203 Other insurgency organizations include the Rwandan Hutu 
insurgency organization, Burundian Hutu insurgency organization, the National Army for 
the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).204 There are six 
academic organizations representing four madrassas, technical colleges, and secondary 
schools; five terrorist organizations (ADF, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Iran 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab); two Jihadist 
organizations (Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) and the Muslim Youth Centre 
(MYC)); two charitable organizations (Al-Haramyn Foundation and orphanage centers); 
and one religious organization (Mosques). There are also two criminal organizations (the 
                                                 
203 Raise Hope for Congo, “Armed Groups.” 
204 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
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Tanga criminal organization and financial support organization). The histogram also 
indicates that only two organizations had shared bombing activities: al-Shabaab and 
ADF. In total, there were 81 links connecting the just mentioned organizations. 
1. Link Analysis 
The link analysis in Figure 7 displays related organizations within the ADF 
Network.  
 
Figure 7.  Link Diagram of the Combined ADF Network. 
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The link diagram in Figure 7 represents the combined ADF network, which 
depicts the relationships among the previously mentioned organizations. The thesis 
resorted to a combined network because data points on ADF alone could not furnish 
meaningful information. Thus, the combined network refers to a group of organizations 
with direct and indirect connections to ADF. For instance, ADF collaborates 
operationally with the international terrorist organization “al-Shabaab affiliated with al-
Qaida.”205 Al-Shabaab was also linked to 11 recruits who were nabbed recently in 
Tanzania with al-Shabaab training materials.206  
Furthermore, ADF is linked to a number of insurgency organizations in the 
eastern DRC. These organizations are NALU, the Rwandan Hutu insurgency 
organization, Burundian Hutu insurgency organization, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
and Mai-Mai insurgency organization.207 Also, the ADF is associated with all factions 
belonging to Mai-Mai. Other organizations connected to ADF are the Patriotic Alliance 
for a Free and Sovereign Congo and Resistance Nationale Congolaise. The ADF is also 
associated with the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu insurgency organizations because it is 
sympathetic to the Hutu communities in Rwanda and Burundi.208 The current 
relationship between these organizations and the ADF is not known. Available 
information reveals that only NALU has collaborated with the ADF in the identified 
hotspots (see Figure 8). Other organizations are scattered across the North Kivu province 
and South Kivu province. They do not necessarily operate in the same area as the ADF. It 
is not known in what capacity they collaborate with the ADF. However, the ADF is 
believed to have recruited some Congolese militants.209  
The diagram also indicates ADF links with two jihadist organizations: AMYC 
based in Tanzania and the MYC located in Kenya. The diagram shows that the AMYC is 
                                                 
205 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
206 Abdallah Bakari and Katare Mbashiru, “11 Shabaab ‘Recruits’ Arrested after Reports of Secret 
Drills,” The Citizen, October 8, 2013, http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/11-nabbed-with-Shabab-training-
manuals/-/1840392/2023368/-/daqytoz/-/index.html. 
207 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
208 Ibid.  
209 Ibid. 
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also supporting a number of religious and academic organizations in Tanzania 
(madrassas, mosques, orphanage centers, secondary schools, and technical schools). 
Likewise, the MYC-Kenya supports three mosques that are allegedly for radicalizing 
youths.210 The organization is also linked to al-Shabaab. It is likely that the ADF, 
AMYC, and the Tanga criminal organization are dealing with drug trafficking to generate 
funds. All of these organizations are connected through the financial support organization 
established at the port city of Tanga in Tanzania.211 This might also be a legitimate 
business organization that is used to mask money-laundering activities. The Tanga 
criminal organization has been implicated in the past for smuggling goods and people to 
and from Somalia by using fishing boats in Tanga.212 The organization is also presumed 
to have facilitated activities of the AMYC in support of al-Shabaab militants in 
Somalia.213  
2. Geospatial Analysis 
According to data gathered from Jane’s database, there were a total of 47 events 
conducted by the ADF from 1998 to the present (see Figure 8).214 The timeframe was 
chosen because the ADF conducted many events when it began launching its operations. 
But there are few events from 2003 to 2013.  
                                                 




214 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
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Figure 8.  Palantir Heat Map Showing the ADF Activities from 1998 to 2013. 
The concentrations of events (hotspots) appear to be along the western Ugandan 
border with the DRC. Moreover, the heat map shows that events are scattered in northern 
Uganda, Kampala, and other events were conducted within the borders of the DRC. The 
majority of the activities were offensive events conducted by the ADF. The map shows 
29-armed attacks conducted by the ADF in various villages.215 The armed attacks 
account for the majority of the total events about 61.70 percent. Another violent event is 
bombings. There were six bombings amounting to 12.77 percent. Other events included 
five kidnapping events, accounting for 10.64 percent of the total events. Figure 8 also 
shows that there are four criminal activities, amounting to 8.51 percent of all events. 
There were minor events for arms dealing, smuggling, and training events. Each 
contributed 2.13 percent to the total offensive events. The ADF has also been involved in 
criminal activities such as counterfeiting money, illegal taxation on timber production, 
taxation on illegal mining, and procuring arms.216  
The other heat map in Figure 9 shows a total of 38 defensive operations that were 
conducted by Ugandan forces and Congolese National Army forces in response to the 
ADF’s offensive activities, and by law enforcement agencies. 
                                                 




Figure 9.  Heat Map showing Anti-ADF Operations Conducted by Military Forces. 
Defensive operations appear to be carried out in similar areas where the ADF 
operated. The majority of defensive operations were military operations. There were 
about 29 counterinsurgency operations, accounting for 76.32 percent of the total 
defensive events, and eight were law enforcement events conducted to arrest the ADF’s 
militants. This accounts for 21.05 percent. The heat map also shows another law 
enforcement operation, though it is not specified. This accounts to 2.63 percent of the 
total defensive events. 
3. Temporal Analysis 
The timeline chart in Figure 10 indicates the sequence of ADF activities from 
1998 to 2013. In its early years of operation, the ADF conducted a series of bomb attacks 
in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. In 1998, notable attacks included a bomb attack 
in a Kampala restaurant that killed five people, and an attack in western Uganda at the 
technical college that killed 80 students.217 
                                                 
217 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
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Figure 10.  Timeline Chart of the ADF’s Activities from 1998 to 2013. 
The chart in Figure 10 shows that armed attacks, criminal activities, bombings, 
and kidnapping were frequent in 1998 when the group started its operations. In 1999, the 
ADF offensive decreased. It increased again in 2000. The chart shows that from 2001 to 
2002 armed attacks were low compared to the previous time. The timeline chart also 
indicates that, for almost a decade, ADF operations have been characterized by a dormant 
phase, particularly from 2003 to 2007. It is difficult to ascertain whether the ADF ceased 
to operate during this period. This might be attributed to missing data or the organization 
was engaged in the exploitation of natural resources in the eastern DRC.218 Some 
analysts attribute the inactivity as the end of the ADF insurgency.219 However, in 2010, 
al-Shabaab militants presumably collaborated with the ADF in a Kampala attack that 
killed more than 70 people.220 In addition, the timeline chart indicates a rise in 
kidnappings and armed attacks in 2013. The ADF conducted these acts in eastern DRC, 
not in Uganda.221 
By contrast, the timeline chart in Figure 11 shows defensive operations conducted 
by either Ugandan forces or the Congolese National Army intended to defuse the ADF 
                                                 
218 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
219 For details, see International Crisis Group, “Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion.” 
220 IHS Jane’s, “Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).” 
221 For details, see Aljazeera news, “Congolese Influx to Uganda Reaches 60,000.” 
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insurgency. The defensive operations were high in 1998. This reflects the intensity of the 
ADF activities. Thereafter, defensive operations decreased. 
 
Figure 11.  Timeline Chart showing Defensive Operations from 1998 to 2013. 
From 1999 to 2007, the majority of the events appear to be those of law 
enforcement, such as the arrest of ADF members. This period is also characterized by 
military operations in response to the ADF’s offensive. The chart showed a gap in 
defensive operations between 2010 and 2011. The defensive operations seem to be 
heightened in 2013, when the ADF renewed its offensive activities. 
B. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
In SNA, organizations are taken to interact with each other in the same way as 
human beings do. People are embedded in organizations. Yet, organizations and people 
are different social entities. Therefore, in the actual analysis the two entities had to be 
examined separately. Otherwise, it could be like mixing apples with oranges. 
Nevertheless, analysis performed at the organizational level can also be done at the 
individual level. The only difference is that, at the organizational level, the actor is an 
organization, whereas, at the individual level the actor is a person. Moreover, analysis 
was performed at both levels in order to assist in decision-making on what course of 
action to adopt in each instance. 
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Table 1 presents an overview of the most central terrorist/insurgent organizations 
in terms of degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and 
eigenvector centrality.  
Table 1.   Top-Ranked Organizations by Normalized Centrality 
Score. 
Rank Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector 








































































































While Table 1 shows degree centrality for each organization, the score is shown 
in Table 2, later in this chapter. Before proceeding, it is worth refining the meaning of an 
actor. According to Everton, “An actor can be a person, subgroup, organization, 
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collective, community, nation-state, etc.”222 As seen from Figure 12 to Figure 23, the 
actor can also be viewed as a “node or vertex.”223 In these figures, the nodes represent 
organizations or individuals of the ADF combined network.  
1. Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality is defined as “the count of the number of an actor’s ties” (in an 
undirected network).224 This means that central actors are the ones who have more 
connections with other actors. Actors with a high degree centrality have a relatively large 
number of ties, which could indicate their ability to influence or be influenced by other 
actors. As Table 1 indicates, degree centrality ranges from 9.375 to 43.750. The most 
central organization is the AMYC (43.750); the second most central organization is the 
Mai-Mai organization (37.500); the third most central organization is the ADF (31.250); 
the fourth is al-Shabaab (28.125). These organizations are not necessarily more powerful 
than others. However, they could be less dependent on other organizations. Nevertheless, 
they appear to be the most influential organizations within the network. That is to say, 
they can rapidly contact many organizations connected with them. The ability to 
influence other organizations could be done through transmission of information or 
resource exchange (finances, personnel, weapons, etc.). Furthermore, the results indicate 
that there is less variability in organizations with the lowest degree. In this category, 
some organizations have similar scores. For instance, NALU, Rwandan Hutu insurgency 
organization, Burundian Hutu insurgency organization, and Tanga criminal organization 
have scored (12.500). On the other hand, the financial support organization and al-Qaeda 
scored (9.375). Having equivalent degree does not imply these organizations are equally 
the same; this only signifies a similar number of ties. 
Another way to represent central actors is using social network diagrams. As it 
can be seen, the node sizes in Figures 12 to 15 reflect the respective measures of  
 
                                                 
222 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 397. 
223 Ibid., 397. 
224 Ibid., 398‒399. 
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centrality identified in Table 1. The difference between tabular representation and a 
graphical representation is that the former represents numerical scores while the latter 
varies centrality of actors using node sizes.  
 
Figure 12.  Sociogram of the ADF Combined Networks (Larger nodes = Degree 
Centrality). 
The sociogram in Figure 12 depicts node sizes according to the degree centrality 
in Table 1. The larger the node size, the more central the organization is within the 
network. The AMYC appears to have a larger node size compared to others, indicating 
the highest degree of centrality; the second most central organization is the Mai-Mai 
organization; the third most central organization is the ADF, and the fourth is al-Shabaab. 
The remaining organizations have small node sizes signifying lower degrees. 
2. Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality means “how close (in terms of shortest path distance) each 
actor is to all other actors in the network.”225 That is to say “closeness centrality 
calculates the total geodesic distance (shortest path) from one actor to other actors in the 
                                                 
225 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 398. 
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network.”226 The closeness centrality varies from 40.000 to 59.259. The top five central 
organizations are ADF (59.259), the AMYC (55.172), al-Shabaab (50.794), Mai-Mai 
organization (48.485), and Tanga criminal organization (47.059). Financial support 
organizations and NALU have same score (43.836). Similarly, the Rwandan Hutu 
insurgency organization and Burundian Hutu insurgency organization scored 43.243. 
While al-Qaeda scored 41.026, the MYC scored 40.000. The highly scored organizations 
imply that they are closer to every intermediate organization in the network.227 In other 
words, they are capable of communicating with intermediary organizations, which are 
positioned at a shorter distance; the shorter the path length, the more swift the 
transmission of information and/or resource exchange.228 It is interesting to note that 
organizations have fewer variations in closeness centrality as compared to their degree of 
centrality, which is indicative of quick transfer of communication within the ADF 
combined network.  
Figure 13 indicates similar results. Large node sizes reflect organizations closer to 
other organizations in the network. The closer organizations are the ADF, AMYC, al-
Shabaab, and Mai-Mai, as well as the Tanga criminal organization, financial support 
organizations, NALU, the Rwandan Hutu insurgency organization, and the Burundian 
Hutu insurgency organization. 
                                                 
226 Excerpted from Chapter 8 of Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: 
Methods and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) in Class Notes, “Analyzing and 
Representing ‘Two-Mode’ Network Data,” Spring 2010, State University of New York at Albany, accessed 
September 19, 2013, http://www.albany.edu/faculty/kretheme 
/PAD637/ClassNotes/Spring%202010/Week8_Summary.pdf. 
227 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 184. 
228 Ibid., 185. 
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Figure 13.  Sociogram of the ADF Combined Networks (Closeness Centrality). 
3. Betweenness Centrality 
The concept of betweenness centrality entails “actors who are ‘between’ other 
actors.”229 This indicates brokerage potential; ability to broke more contacts with other 
actors, which in turn can be translated into power. The metric in Table 1 ranges from 
0.319 to 52.487. ADF has the highest betweenness score (52.487), followed by AMYC 
(48.404), the Mai-Mai organization (44.355), and al-Shabaab (25.050). These 
organizations are positioned between other organizations (dependents), as seen in Figure 
14. By virtue of their positions, they control information and/or resource flow within the 
network. For instance, Ma-Mai organization, Rwandan Hutu insurgency organization, 
Burundian Hutu insurgency organization, National Army for Liberation of Uganda, and 
Lord’s Resistance Army cannot contact any other organization except through ADF 
(broker). The structural positions of these organizations make them dependent on ADF 
either for information exchange or resource exchange. Eventually, ADF could become 
more powerful over them. Other organizations have the lowest score: MYC (2.016), al-
Qaeda (1.462), NALU (1.109), and Tanga criminal organization (0.319). 
                                                 
229 Robert A. Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Network Methods (University of 
California-Riverside, 2005), accessed December 5, 2013, 
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C10_Centrality.html-Degree. 
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The sociogram in Figure 14 indicates that organizations with large node sizes 
score the highest betweenness. The organizations with the highest betweenness scores are 
the ADF, followed by AMYC, the Mai-Mai organization, and al-Shabaab. These 
organizations are central because they are positioned between the shortest paths of other 
organizations.230 
 
Figure 14.  Sociogram of the ADF Combined Networks (Betweenness Centrality). 
4. Eigenvector Centrality 
According to Everton, the eigenvector centrality assumes that ties to central (well-
connected) actors are more important than ties to peripheral (less connected) actors and 
thus weighs each actor’s summed connections to others by the others’ centrality 
scores.”231 What Everton meant here is that the centrality of the actor is determined by 
the centralities of adjacent actors.232 
The eigenvector centrality in Table 1 varies from 18.686 to 75.117. The ADF has 
the highest score (75.117), followed by AMYC (60.843), al-Shabaab (56.425), Tanga 
                                                 
230 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 189. 
231 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 400. 
232 Excerpted from Chapter 8 of Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications in Class Notes, “Analyzing and Representing ‘Two-Mode’ Network Data,” Spring 2010, State 
University of New York at Albany. 
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criminal organization (47.886), financial support organization (34.210), and Mai-Mai 
Organization (20.977). Other organizations view the most central organizations as 
important ones to deal with, bearing in mind of the accrued benefits associating with 
them. Almost all organizations that appear to be central in terms of degree centrality, 
closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality have highest scores in eigenvector 
centrality as well. All other organizations have low Eigenvector scores as depicted by 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Sociogram of the ADF Combined Networks (Eigenvector Centrality). 
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Table 2.   Normalized Measures of Centrality (People-to-People). 
Rank Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector 
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Table 2 represents measures of centrality at the individual level. Whereas the 
sociograms in Figures 14 through 16 display the centrality of individuals by node sizes in 
the ADF combined network. The node sizes of the most central actors correspond to the 
respective metrics in Table 2. The significance of displaying centrality of actors by using 
sociograms was to identify most important persons in relation to their position and ties 
within the ADF combined network.233 The commonly used measures are the degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. The eigenvector centrality is 
not so common.234 Still, in all measures of centrality, the interpretation is similar to that 
                                                 
233 Douglas Luke, “Prominence: Understanding a Network through Analysis of Individual Positions of 
Actors,” presented at the Institute on Systems Science and Health, June 10‒15, 2012, George Warren 
Brown School of Social Work, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, accessed December 22, 2013, 
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/issh/2012/files/ISSH%20Prominence%20V1.pdf. 
234 Ibid.  
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of the organizational level. Starting with degree centrality, as Table 2 shows , the top five 
central actors in the ADF combined network are Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan 
(25.806), figure head of AMYC; Amis Kashada (22.581), ADF Deputy Army 
Commander; Muhammad Kayira (16.129), ADF Chief of Combat Operations; Shehe 
Rashid Muene (16.129), head of the Tanga criminal organization, relation to Nassoro 
Said Muene, and owner of the organization; and Salim Awadh Bafadhil (12.903), Deputy 
Director of the AMYC. Correspondingly, Nassoro Said Muene has similar score of 
12.903.  
 
Figure 16.  Sociogram of Degree Centrality. 
In terms of closeness centrality, the top five actors are Jamil Mukulu (36.905), 
Politico-military leader of the ADF); Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (36.047; Hood 
Lukwago (35.227), (ADF Army Commander; Amis Kashada (32.979), and Shehe Rashid 
Muene (28.704). There is no much difference for the remaining actors.  
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Figure 17.  Sociogram of Closeness Centrality. 
In terms of Betweenness Centrality, Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan scored 
the highest betweenness score (66.344), followed by Amis Kashada (60.645), Jamil 
Mukulu (57.634), and Hood Lukwago (50.323). 
 
Figure 18.  Sociogram of Betweenness Centrality. 
In terms of Eigenvector Centrality, the top actors are Shehe Rashid Muene 




Figure 19.  Sociogram of Eigenvector Centrality. 
C. COHESIVE SUBGROUP ANALYSIS 
1. Subgroups 
The Girvan-Newman algorithms identified four clusters or cohesive subgroups in 
the ADF combined network, as seen in Figure 20. This measure was chosen to identify 
organizational subgroups that are located within the same dense cluster of the network. 
The identified subgroups in Figure 20 are: subgroup 1 (shown in black) consists of the 
Mai-Mai organization; subgroup 2 (shown in green) includes the ADF, NALU, LRA, the 
Rwandan Hutu insurgency organization, and the Burundian Hutu insurgency 
organization; subgroup 3 (shown in blue) consists of the AMYC, MYC, Tanga criminal 
organization, and financial support organization; subgroup 4 (shown in red) includes al 




Figure 20.  NetDraw Graph of Subgroups in the ADF Combined Network. 
2. Key Players 
In the same manner, the key player algorithm was used to determine whether the 
removal of some organizations would disrupt or fragment the ADF aggregated 
network.235 In identifying key organizations for removal, the ORA software fragmented 
the network into a critical set of organizations. The fragmentation was based on the 
number of organizations that can reach each other in the network. The fragmentation 
value of the original network was 0.876894. The fragmentation after removing the critical 
set nodes was 1.0. The identified critical set contains five organizations: al-Shabaab, 
Muslim Youth Centre (MYC-Kenya), Mai-Mai organization, ADF, and Rwandan Hutu 
insurgency organization (Figure 21).  
                                                 
235 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 253. 
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Figure 21.  ORA Critical Set Visualization (Organization-to-Organization). 
3. Constraint and Cutpoints 
Two additional techniques for identifying potential key actors are finding those 
who sit along “structural holes” and locating those who serve as “cutpoints.” The former 
is simply a hole or “a gap in the social structure”236 created by actors lying on one side or 
the other side of the bridge.237 Actors who sit along these gaps possess the potential to 
serve as brokers (controllers of resources flow) between dense clusters. They are also 
relatively unconstrained in the triads in which they are embedded. In other words, the 
actors with the relatively lower levels of constraint will have the ability to act more freely 
and serve as brokers. Another technique is Cutpoints, or actors who if removed create 
disconnect in the network. Cutpoints have a score up to 1.00 and a score of 0.00 for non-
cutpoints. The act of removing either constraint actors or cutpoints potentially makes the 
network vulnerable to disruption. On this Everton cautions, removal of such actors is a 
                                                 
236 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 403. 
237 Ibid., 253. 
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necessary albeit insufficient condition to disconnect the network. Unless it is a densely 
connected network, however, it is impossible to locate such actors in a loosely connected 
network.238 Table 3 shows the extent to which actors are constrained and those serving as 
cutpoints in the ADF combined network.  
Table 3.   Structural Hole Measures in UCINET. 
Rank Constraint Cutpoint 
1. Abu Huzhaifa (1.007) Shehe Rashid Muene (1.00) 
2. Abdul Hakim Omar (1.007) Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan 
(1.00) 
3. Abubakar Shariff (1.000) Fuad Abdulrahim Barahiyan (1.00) 
4. Benjamin Kisokolanio (1.000) Sharif Twaibu (1.00) 
5. Philip Muzamir Bogere (1.000) Amis Kashada (1.00) 
6. Amigo Kibirige (1.000) Muhammad Kayira (1.00) 
7. Mukwaya (1.000) Musa Baluku (1.00) 
8. Kassim Kyambalangu (1.000) Mohamadi Bunu (1.00) 
9. Abdu Hamid Diiru (1.000) Mohammed Luminsa (1.00) 
10. Mbwana Faki (1.000) Hood Lukwago (1.00) 
11. Kombo (1.000) Nassoro Rashid Muene (0.00) 
12. Nooh Moses (1.000) Ali Kassim (0.00) 
13. Albert (1.000) Abdallah Mte (0.00) 
14. Ali Kassim (0.934) Captain Matupa (0.00) 
15. Abdallah Mte (0.934) Abubakar Shariff (0.00) 
16. Captain Matupa (0.934) Abu Huzhaifa (0.00) 
17. Mohammed Luminsa (0.707) Abdul Hakim Omar (0.00) 
18. Mohamad Mahusufi (0.707) Philip Muzamir Bogere (0.00) 
19. Nassoro Rashid Muene (0.703) Salim Awadh Bafadhil (0.00) 
20. Fuad Abdulrahim Barahiyan (0.611) Benjamin Kisokolanio (0.00) 
21. Salim Awadh Bafadhil (0.578) Amigo Kibirige (0.00) 
22. Shehe Rashid Muene (0.531) Mukwaya (0.00) 
23. Sharif Twaibu (0.500) Kassim Kyambalangu (0.00) 
24. Musa Baluku (0.500) Abdu Hamid Diiru (0.00) 
25. Balilyokwabe (0.500) Mbwana Faki (0.00) 
26. Abdulbasit Sera (0.500) Kombo (0.00) 
27. Hood Lukwago (0.500) Balilyokwabe (0.00) 
28. Mohamadi Bunu (0.425) Abdulbasit Sera (0.00) 
29. Jamil Mukulu (0.333) Mohammed Luminsa (0.00) 
30. Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (0.221) Mohammed Mahusufi (0.00) 
31. Muhammad Kayira (0.200) Nooh Moses (0.00) 
32. Amis Kashada (0.143) Albert (0.00) 
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Five actors are seen to have low constraint scores: Amis Kashada (0.143), the 
ADF Deputy Army Commander: Muhammad Kayira (0.200); the ADF Chief of Combat 
Operations, Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (0.221); AMYC director, Jamil Mukulu 
(0.333); the ADF leader; Mohamadi Bunu (0.425); AMYC chairman for Dawah; and 
Hood Lukwago (0.500), the ADF Army Commander. According to Everton the actors 
with low constraint scores are more independent and have extensive brokerage 
potential,239 especially if they are in an open triad, as seen in Figure 22.240 
 
Figure 22.  Sociogram Showing the Constraint of Each Actor  
(Smaller nodes = lower levels of constraint). 
The sociogram in Figure 22 corresponds to the constraint estimates in Table 3. 
Node sizes indicate the constraint of each actor. The larger node sizes point to actors with 
the highest constraint score, indicative of the least brokerage potential. While the smaller 
node sizes show actors with low constraint scores, implying higher brokerage potential. 
That is to say, low-constraint individuals are more capable of controlling the flow of 
resources or information within a network than others.241 These actors form four types of 
open triads. The first triad consists of Mohamed Bunu (leader of al-Shabaab recruits in 
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Tanzania), Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (head of AMYC), and Jamil Mukulu 
(politico-military leader of the ADF). The second triad is comprised of Sheikh Salim 
Abdulrahim Barahiyan, Jamil Mukulu, and Hood Lukwago (ADF army commander). The 
third triad is composed of Jamil Mukulu, Hood Lukwago, and Amis Kashada (ADF 
deputy army commander). The fourth triad is made up of Hood Lukwago, Amis Kashada, 
and Muhammad Kayira (ADF Chief of Combat Operations). In the first triad, Jamil 
Mukulu is positioned between Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan and Hood Lukwago. 
This position is advantageous to Mukulu because he is in the position of brokering 
contacts between Barahiyan and Lukwago.242 The same applies for Bunu, Lukwago, and 
Kashada. They are all located at the intermediary positions.  
4. Cutpoints 
Table 3 also represents scores for the cutpoints. The cutpoints are actors with a 
score of 1.00. If they are taken out, then the network will break apart.243 Non-cutpoints 
are all other actors with a zero score. Figure 23 reflects the cutpoints in red-colored nodes 
and non-cutpoints in the blue-colored nodes. 
 
Figure 23.  NetDraw Sociogram Showing Cutpoints (Red-colored). 
                                                 
242 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 254. 
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The sociogram clearly points out actors who have been identified as cutpoints; if 
they were removed from the network, it would disconnect and eventually be weakened. 
The cutpoints are Shehe Rashid Muene, leader of the Tanga drug organization; Sheikh 
Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan, head of AMYC; Fuad Abdulrahim Barahiyan; Sharif 
Twaibu, kin to Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan; Amis Kashada, the ADF Deputy 
army commander; Muhammad Kayira, the ADF Chief of Combat Operations; Musa 
Baluku, the ADF Chief Political Commissar; Mohamadi Bunu, AMYC Chairman for 
Dawah; Mohammed Luminsa, the ADF director of training and recruitment; and Hood 
Lukwago, the ADF army commander.  
 67 
V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. 
—Mao Tse-tung 
Based on the data analysis chapter, a number of violent acts are the cause for 
concern. There is a separatist movement in the island of Zanzibar, which is driven by 
political change.244 The Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation led the 
violence on the island. The association’s goal is to achieve full autonomy for the 
island.245 In addition, in May 2013, violence in Mtwara was perpetrated by hungry mobs 
of civilians who opposed the government’s plan to construct a gas pipeline from the 
Mtwara region to Dar es Salaam. The riots resulted in killings and destruction of 
property.246 Furthermore, in October 2013, al-Shabaab sympathizers were arrested in 
Mtwara while conducting terrorist training. The speculation is that they might have been 
preparing to sabotage the gas infrastructure they opposed.247 And finally, the security 
forces in Tanzania have yet to establish who was behind the bombing attacks in Arusha 
and what their motive was.  
Although violent events in Tanzania appear to be isolated incidences, they do put 
the country at risk.248 Terrorists may exploit the opportunity presented by local 
grievances and use the pre-existing groups to induce homegrown terrorism aimed at 
conducting major attacks.249 As noted by Louise Richardson in her book What Terrorists 
Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, a failure to interpret the signals 
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emitted by the hostile security environment and to address such problems may exacerbate 
a violent culture: a condition favoring the terrorism to flourish.250 Violent hotspots shown 
by the geospatial analysis in Figure 4 have the potential to be used by terrorists as a 
recruitment and radicalization ground to motivate youth to join their ranks. They also 
have the potential for future violence in Tanzania. 
In terms of ADF, no evidence was found from either the geospatial analysis or 
temporal analysis that would associate ADF activities with violent events that occurred in 
Tanzania from 2012 to 2013. The link diagram in Figure 5 depicts a different picture, 
however. It appears that there is an intrusion of the ADF and its affiliates within the 
borders of Tanzania. Additionally, the 11 people arrested while conducting terrorist 
training with al-Shabaab training materials substantiate this claim. This suggests that 
youth radicalization is taking place in Tanzania. Furthermore, the financial support 
organization at the port city of Tanga appears to generate funds that sustain the ADF’s 
activities. There is no information that shows the flow of financial resources. In line with 
this, on March 2013, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a report 
that establishes a correlation between the drug trafficking business and terrorism 
financing.251 This suggests that the Tanga-based drug cell might be collaborating with the 
ADF in operating a drug business in Tanzania, although no available data can establish 
this link. 
Overall, there is no organization that appears to be the most central in all 
measures of centrality. However, the normalized centrality scores indicate that the ADF 
is the most central organization in terms of closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The 
second most central organization in these three measures is the AMYC. This does not 
necessarily mean that the two organizations have decision-making power in the combined 
network. The information only reveals that the ADF and MYC communicate with more 
organizations than others do. In terms of degrees of centrality, the AMYC is the most 
central organization followed by the Mai-Mai organization, the ADF, and al-Shabaab. 
The structural position of these organizations favors them. More ties indicate greater 
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opportunities, more choices, and less dependence on other organizations. For instance, 
the ADF can exchange resources with terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab and al-
Qaeda. It can also do an exchange with insurgency organizations in the eastern DRC, the 
Tanga-based drug organization, AMYC, and the financial support organization. If one 
organization ceases to cooperate, the ADF can still exchange resources with another 
organization, which suggests that the ADF is in a position that provides it with 
opportunities to either directly influence other organizations or be directly influenced by 
them. Besides being the most influential organization, the ADF and its affiliates have the 
potential to influence the radicalization of youth groups and already existing local groups 
with grievances against the Tanzanian government, although these links have not been 
established. 
What is more, ADF is the most central organization in terms of closeness 
centrality. At this position, it has the shortest communication paths, which implies it is 
the only organization that can swiftly communicate with all other organizations in the 
network without depending on any one of them for communications.252 On the other 
hand, the insurgency organizations linked to the ADF in the eastern DRC are 
disadvantaged within the network. This is due to their structural positions; they are 
incapable of passing information to terrorist organizations or other organizations except 
through the ADF communication links, if they need to do so.253 In terms of betweenness 
centrality, the ADF is positioned between each of the other pairs of organizations. There 
is no other organization that lies between the ADF and other organizations. If the ADF 
wants to communicate with terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida, or other 
organizations, such as AMYC, the Tanga criminal organization, the financial support 
organization, or with insurgent organizations, it may do so. But the insurgent 
organizations cannot contact the terrorist organization without passing the information 
through the ADF. This indicates that only the ADF can broker contacts with other 
organizations within the network. For example, it might prevent an insurgent 
organization from communicating with terrorist organizations. This is why Stanley 
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Wasserman and Katherine Faust note that organizations with maximum betweenness 
centrality may leverage communications of nonadjacent organizations.254 Again the ADF 
was found to have the highest eigenvector centrality. Being the most central organization 
within the network makes other organizations view ADF as an important organization 
with which to associate. Since the ADF appears to be the most central organization in 
terms of closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, 
according to the available information, it can be inferred that the ADF’s central position 
makes it more influential within the combined network. This gives the ADF opportunity 
to influence or be influenced by other organizations. Likewise, Rodney Muhumuza 
asserts, “The ADF is like a licensed company which is not operational…. They are 
available for hire.”255 In spite of that, the overall results could be due to boundary 
specification. That is to say, the thesis has focused on collecting ADF data points, which 
likely made the ADF appear as a more central organization. 
In people-to-people relationships, there was no information to link members of al-
Shabaab and al-Qaeda with other actors in the combined network. Moreover, there is no 
actor who appears to be the most central in all measures of centrality. However, Sheikh 
Salim Abdurahim Barahiyan (leader of AMYC) appears to have the highest degree of 
centrality. This position provides him with the opportunity to influence and/or be 
influenced by other actors in the network. He also has maximum betweenness centrality, 
indicative of brokerage potential. Barahiyan might be playing the role of brokering 
contacts with other actors in the network. In closeness centrality, the most central actor is 
Jamil Mukulu (ADF leader). This implies that he can quickly communicate and relay 
information to other individuals within the network without depending on any other 
actor. In terms of eigenvector centrality, three actors were found to have the highest 
scores. These individuals are Shehe Rashid Muene (leader of the Tanga criminal 
organization) and Nassoro Rashid Muene (owner of the Tanga criminal organization 
related to Shehe Rashid Muene). Another central actor is Sheikh Salim Abdurahim 
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Barahiyan. These actors are viewed as important associates and most likely provide 
important pieces of information to other actors in the combined network. The findings 
also indicate that five actors have brokerage potential and 11 individuals are cutpoints. 
The brokers are in a position to control other individuals who are connected to them. That 
is, they depend on brokers for information and material exchange. The identified 
cutpoints, by contrast, are individuals with low constraint; if they were removed the 
combined network would get disconnected. 
To a large extent, the ADF terrorist organization operates in the eastern DRC. Its 
area of operations seems to be far from the borders of Tanzania. Besides, the organization 
has not conducted any transnational attacks. However, caution has to be taken here. 
Neither border nor distance is an obstacle to terrorism. This suffices to say that Tanzania 
may be under less threat, but not safer. At the same time, the ADF does not appear to 
pose an imminent threat to Tanzania, at least not in the short term. However, in the long 
term, there is the potential, taking into consideration the collaboration between the ADF 
and al-Shabaab in the 2010 Kampala bombing and recently in the Westgate mall attack in 
Nairobi.256 The alliance between al-Shabaab and ADF in East Africa is also worrisome. 
The recent resurgence of the ADF indicates that the group has regrouped. It is also 
believed that the organization has recruited Somali refugees living in Kenya.257 It is 
possible for the ADF to use its base in the eastern DRC to harbor terrorists and turn East 
Africa into a “zombie” territory.258 For this purpose, the next chapter presents suggested 
intervention strategies.  
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VI. STRATEGIC CHOICES TO DISRUPT THE ADF TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION 
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate alternative intervention strategies and come 
up with one that could disrupt the ADF insurgency network. The desired end state is to 
minimize the risk of the ADF exporting terrorism into the borders of Tanzania. The 
suggested alternative strategies are as follows: 
 Targeting identified actors 
 Reducing tangible support 
 Pursuing a regional initiative 
A. TARGETING SPECIFIC ACTORS  
This strategy entails targeting of central actors both at the organizational level and 
individual level. Organizational targeting can be extended to the most central 
organizations (AMYC, the ADF, and the Mai-Mai organization). Similarly, targeting 
could include organizations found to be key players in the network (al-Shabaab, MYC, 
the Mai-Mai organization, ADF, and Rwandan Hutu insurgency organization). Since 
Tanzania has troops in the FIB, this implies that its mandate is only applicable to fighting 
negative forces in the eastern DRC. The organizations like al-Shabaab and MYC are 
outside the area of operations of the FIB and cannot be targeted as such. A kinetic (lethal) 
approach and/or a non-kinetic (non-lethal) approach can be employed to target 
organizations operating in the eastern DRC and Tanzania.259 The critical set of 
organizations for removal was found to be al-Shabaab, MYC, Mai-Mai organization, 
ADF, and the Rwandan Hutu organization. Targeting these organizations would fragment 
the ADF combined network.  
On the other side, the government has to regulate the activities of religious 
organizations, denounce ones supporting terrorist organizations, and prosecute those 
engaging in illicit businesses. Moreover, at the individual level, targeting could be 
conducted on those who have been shown to have brokerage potential or who are 
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cutpoints. These individuals are Shehe Rashid Muene (leader of the Tanga drug 
organization); Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (head of AMYC); Fuad Abdulrahim 
Barahiyan; Sharif Twaibu (kin to Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan), and Amis 
Kashada (ADF deputy army commander). Others are Muhammad Kayira (ADF chief of 
combat operations); Musa Baluku (ADF chief political commissar); Mohamadi Bunu 
(AMYC chairman for Dawah); Mohammed Luminsa (ADF director of training and 
recruitment); and Hood Lukwago (ADF army commander). 
B. REDUCING TANGIBLE SUPPORT 
Employing military action to thwart armed organizations in the eastern DRC is a 
necessary albeit insufficient condition to clear them.260 So, after gathering more 
intelligence, the FIB has to identify tangible (internal and external) support to the ADF 
and reduce it. The center of gravity should be local people in the eastern DRC where the 
organization has blended itself. That is where the ADF obtains recruits, gets food, 
sympathy, intelligence, finance, and sanctuary. The FIB can disconnect the group from 
the populace by conducting information campaigns to delegitimize it. Eventually, lack of 
support would weaken the ADF insurgents and force them to engage in criminal activity 
such as looting the civilians. In so doing, the ADF militants would become visible for 
targeting by the FIB. Money facilitates terrorist operations.261 Therefore, the ADF’s 
financial support (from both legal businesses and illegal businesses) in Tanzania has to be 
scrutinized and shut down. Further effort has to be directed at neutralizing ADF cross-
border businesses. This will deter the ADF from operating within Tanzania.  
C. PURSUING A REGIONAL INITIATIVE  
Tanzania could increase diplomatic ties with member states of the East African 
Community (EAC): Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya. Regardless of the differences 
in strategic interests and priorities between them, nations become stronger as a group and 
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individually when they work towards common interests. This strategy strives to influence 
the political will and sincere commitment for all member states to formulate a regional 
strategy to dismantle ADF and its networks across the Eastern Africa region. This 
strategy will not only ensure sustainable peace and stability in DRC, but also stabilize the 
African Great Lakes region as a whole. To achieve this, the regional initiative strategy 
also advocates an increase in security cooperation between members of the EAC. 
Additionally, the community has to strengthen the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism 
Centre (RDCTC) based in Nairobi. The Centre has to be adequately funded and furnished 
with more personnel, especially analysts. Adequate funding will enable the RDCTC to be 
operational by employing human sources that can be tasked to gather intelligence. For 
instance, they can penetrate the ADF financial support cells in East Africa. This will 
assist to obtain intelligence, which can be used to target and completely cut off finances 
supporting ADF activities. 
D. THE ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS  
The proposed strategies are to be evaluated using the multi-criteria decision-
making approach, better known as the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The 
technique employs four criteria:  
 Length of Time: How long will the strategy take to realize the desired end 
state? 
 Payoff: Is it likely to achieve strategic utility (military and political 
objective)? 
 National Security: Is the strategy likely to increase the national security of 
Tanzania? 
 Resources Required: What is the number of resources needed to 
implement the strategy? 
The AHP procedure uses paired comparisons by comparing each criterion over 
another using the scale of relative importance or weight as seen in Table 4. “The set of 
pairwise comparisons consists of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and their reciprocals}.”262 
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Table 4.   AHP Definition of Relative Importance. 
 
 
Using the scale in Table 4, matrices of the paired comparison for each criterion on 
each strategy were created in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Matrices of Each Criterion and its Relative Importance. 
 
 
Then the matrices for each criterion were converted into fractions. Thereafter, the 
values in columns of each matrix were added to find column sums. The values in the 
columns were divided by the corresponding column sums. Then, the average for each 
row was calculated (Table 6).  
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Table 6.   Calculation of Row Average. 
 
 
A similar procedure was repeated to calculate the row average for the remaining 
criteria (A2 – A4) as seen in Table 7. 
 
Table 7.   Row Average for Criteria A2 to A4. 
 
 
The row average of all the criteria formed the matrix (Table 8). 
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Table 8.   Row Average of all the Criteria. 
 
 
Likewise, the same procedure was used to rank the criteria in order of importance 
(Table 9). 
Table 9.   Ranking of Each Criterion. 
 
 
Then, the row average for each criterion was deduced (Table 10).263  
Table 10.   Criteria Matrix. 
 
 
Multiplying the criteria matrix in Table 10 by the preference vector or weight 
yields the final score in Table 11. 
                                                 
263 Note that the row average equals the preference vector. 
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Table 11.   Final Decision. 
 
 
E. FINAL RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the final score, the recommended intervention strategy includes the 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
A. OVERVIEW  
1. Restated Problem 
This thesis conducted a risk assessment to ascertain the threat posed to Tanzania 
by the ADF terrorist organization, which is operating in the eastern Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Specifically, the thesis looked at the potential for the ADF to export 
terrorism into Tanzania. This study was performed based on the contention that Tanzania 
has contributed a battalion to the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade to clear all 
negative forces in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, there are numerous illegal armed 
organizations that have been implicated in the exploitation of mineral resources in the 
eastern DRC to sustain their activities. These organizations include the Allied Democratic 
Forces terrorist organization, which has been linked to the Somali-based al-Shabaab, an 
affiliate of al-Qaeda.  
Presumably, the profit from illicit business in minerals might be accrued to the 
terrorist organizations that are associated with the ADF network. So flushing the ADF out 
of eastern DRC might make the ADF collude with its associates to launch retaliatory 
attacks into Tanzanian territory. In addition, the ADF might be hired by international 
terrorist organizations to target Tanzania: 1) to undermine the legitimacy of Tanzania’s 
peace initiative in eastern DRC; and 2) to divert the government’s attention from 
Congolese conflicts so that armed groups can continue enjoying the freedom of action 
and exploiting natural resources in the eastern DRC.  
2. Data Collection and Data Structuring 
The unstructured data were gathered from open-source literature to study the 
problem that the thesis set out to address. Before actual data analysis was conducted, the 
unstructured data had to be transformed into a structured format that could be used by 
visual analytic software (Palantir), as well as social network analysis applications (ORA 
and UCINET). 
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Data analysis was divided into two parts: visual analytics and social network 
analysis (SNA). The analysis was divided into two parts because NSA provides more 
robust relational analysis. Visual analytics used three methodologies: link analysis, 
geospatial analysis, and temporal analysis. Link analysis mapped all organizations linked 
to the ADF terrorist organization. The geospatial study analyzed violent events associated 
with the ADF that occurred in specified locations. The temporal study analyzed ADF 
violent events that occurred from 1998 to 2013. Visual analytics also covered defensive 
events conducted by security forces to neutralize the ADF’s offensive. The second 
analytic part assessed the social network data using SNA software capable of performing 
detailed analysis. The analysis was performed at two levels: organizational level and 
individual level. Sub-organizations were excluded from SNA. In addition, the SNA used 
four measures of centrality: degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The 
analysis also covered sub-groups and key players at the organizational level, while 
constraint analysis and cutpoints were only performed at the individual level of analysis. 
3. Key Results 
a. Regarding violent events in Tanzania, there was no evidence to suggest that 
there is “chain reaction” attributed to the making of the ADF. The geospatial analysis 
indicated a disconnection between the ADF’s activities and violent events in Tanzania. 
Nevertheless, the findings from link analysis indicate that the ADF has intruded into 
Tanzania territory through the port of Tanga. This is where it has sought financial support 
for its activities. It is evidenced by links between the ADF, the Ansaar Muslim Youth 
Centre (AMYC-Tanga), and the Tanga-based criminal organization in Tanzania. 
b. Overall results indicate that no single organization was found to be central in 
all measures of centrality. Nevertheless, the ADF was found to be the most central 
organization in terms of closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The Ansar Muslim 
Youth Centre followed it. Having high centrality scores does not imply that these 
organizations have more power over other organizations. Nevertheless, their positions 
within the network provide them with favorable chances to communicate with many 
more organizations than other organizations do. These organizations with high centrality 
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scores may also sit in a position to broker communication and resource flow. Moreover, 
they sit in positions favoring them to be more influential or influenced by other 
organizations.  
c. Up to the present, the ADF terrorist organization has shown no capabilities to 
conduct transnational attacks. However, in the past the ADF has collaborated with al-
Shabaab to attack Uganda and Kenya. Consequently, there is good reason for Tanzania to 
prepare for such attacks in the East African region before they occur on its soil. 
d. There is no evidence to substantiate assertions that the ADF is planning to 
attack Tanzania. However, there are red flags that this thesis has identified: 
 The ADF financial support at the port of Tanga. The port could be used 
for money laundering activities and as an illegal transit hub. All these 
could create a favorable environment for terrorist organizations to plan 
attacks. 
 The links between the ADF, AMYC, and Tanga criminal organizations. 
This alliance can facilitate radicalization and recruitment of youths. 
Eventually, this could lead to incursion of terrorists into Tanzania. 
 Risk areas for radicalization are the island of Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, 
Mtwara, and Arusha. These areas also have the potential for violence to 
recur in the future. 
 There is a possibility that the ADF might use proxy attacks, collaborating 
with its associates the Somali-base al-Shabaab—just as it did in 2010 in 
Kampala and 2013 in Nairobi. Not only that, the ADF can calculate a 
strike that could have a force multiplier because of the already existing 
extremists in Tanzania. 
e. Even if the attacks do not occur, Tanzania runs the risk of a diplomatic row 
with Uganda due to the presence of the ADF financial support in Tanzania. In this 
context, Tanzania should not allow its territory being used as a base by ADF to launch 
attacks on Ugandan soil. 
4. Conclusion 
The Allied Democratic Forces do not appear to pose an imminent security threat 
to Tanzania, at least in the short term. However, there is a potential long-term threat for 
Tanzania. The question to ponder is whether the scenario of the Westgate Mall siege 
might repeat itself in Tanzania. Within this thesis, three strategies were proposed to 
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respond to the ADF terrorist organizations. These strategies are: targeting actors (both 
organizations and individuals), reducing tangible support to the ADF, and sponsoring 
regional initiatives. Four criteria were employed to select the most appropriate strategy, 
which is to cut off tangible support to the ADF. Adopting this course of action is 
expected to weaken the ADF terrorist organization—not only in Tanzania, but also in the 
eastern DRC. 
B. ADDITIONAL STRATEGIES  
Given the network and connections that the ADF has established within Tanzania, 
the Tanzanian government might pursue these additional strategies beyond the three 
identified in this thesis, should resources be available:  
 Increase counterterrorism awareness through community policing; as put 
by Phillip Mudd, “see something, say something.”264 Here Tanzanian 
citizens have to be encouraged to be vigilant and to report any suspicious 
behavior and/or activity.  
 Increase border security. This requires coordinated efforts to neutralize 
cross-border threats. For example, vigorously patrolling the Tanga 
coastline. Ensuring that fishing ports in Tanga are not used as a “safe 
haven” by terrorist organizations or organized criminals (both local and 
international). 
 Implement de-radicalization programs to eradicate violent culture. These 
programs could moderate people already lured by extremist ideology.  
 Address genuine grievances aired by interest groups. Suppressing local 
grievances would do more harm than good. Doing so has a tendency to 
motivate people to find a justifiable cause for revolt against the 
government.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are a couple of security threats to Tanzania’s national security that might 
emanate from the war-torn state of the DRC. Flushing out insurgency organizations in the 
eastern DRC does not guarantee that the threat would be cleared completely. For  
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instance, the ex-militants of defeated organizations may turn to other criminal activities. 
Some of them may run away with weapons and sell them to get money for a living. Thus, 
this thesis proposes the following studies: 
1. How does the instability in the eastern DRC pose a security threat to 
Tanzania? Specifically, researchers can look at the following organized 
crimes:  
 Illicit smuggling of firearms: proliferation of small arms and armed 
killings are on the rise in Tanzania. Is there a small arms 
smuggling network? Who are they? How do they operate? 
 Cross-border crime: Tanzania is bordering on the DRC in the west. 
People living in the western regions have been suffering from 
armed robbery and piracy on Lake Tanganyika. Do armed groups 
operating in the eastern DRC perpetrate these crimes? 
 Another area of interest could be elephant poaching: Is there a link 
between illegal killing of elephants in Tanzania and terrorism 
financing in East Africa? 
2. Recently, Tanzania sent back illegal immigrants to their respective 
countries. These immigrants were posing under the guise of refugees. 
However, it is believed that some of them hid away from being cracked 
down by Tanzanian security forces. To what extent has this exercise 
helped to neutralize the threat posed by illegal immigrants?  
3. In a real sense, social network data concerning terrorist organizations are 
either incomplete or seldom found.265 This is because these organizations 
are hidden and they conduct clandestine operations. However, they are 
political and violent. This makes them vulnerable to detection. In this 
regard, there are still unknowns regarding the ADF terrorist organization.  
 What are the capabilities of the ADF?   
 What has recently strengthened this organization?  
 To what extent does the ADF collaborate with al-Shabaab? 
 
                                                 
265 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social Science 
Structure12, (2009). 
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 Did the ADF facilitate radicalization, recruitment, and the training 
of al-Shabaab recruits arrested in Tanzania? Who provided them 












1 Academic Organization 
2 Airport/Air Field 
3 Bank 
4 Business (Commercial 
Organization) 
5 Charity (Non-Profit/Charitable Org) 
6 Criminal Organization 
7 Government Organization 
8 International Organization 
9 Law Enforcement Organization 
10 Media Organization 
11 Military Organization 
12 Mosque 
13 Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO)  
14 Organization (General) 
15 Political Organization 
16 Prison 
17 Religious Organization 
18 Synagogue 
19 Terrorist/Insurgent Organization 
 
 
1 Funding Source 
2 Latitude & Longitude 
(Add later if necessary) 
People->Organization: 
 
1 Academic: Teacher (student of), Employee/Ex, 
Visitor, Affiliated  
2 Airport/Air Field: Employee/Ex, Visitor 
3 Bank: Employee/Ex, Financier (customer), 
Visitor 
4 Business: Employee/Ex, Financier, Affiliated 
5 Charity: Employee/Ex. Financier, Affiliated 
6 Criminal: Member/Ex, Affiliated (use when 
unclear) 
7 Government: Employee/Ex, Financier, Affiliated 
8 International: Employee/Ex, Financier, Affiliated 
9 Law Enforcement: Employee/Ex, Affiliated 
(informant) 
10 Media: Employee/Ex, Affiliated (source) 
11 Military: Employee/Ex, Affiliated (informant) 
12 Mosque: Employee/Ex, Financier, Member/Ex, 
Visitor 
13 NGO: Employee/Ex, Financier, Affiliated 
14 General: Affiliated, Employee/Ex, Financier, 
Visitor, Member/Ex  
15 Political: Member/Ex, Employee/Ex, Financier, 
Affiliated 
16 Prison: Employee/Ex, Member/Ex 
(incarcerated/released) 
17 Religious: Member/Ex, Affiliated, Visitor 
18 Synagogue: Employee/Ex, Financier, 
Member/Ex, Visitor 





1 Camp  
2 City/Village  
3 Commercial Building  
4 Government Building  
5 House  
6 Location  
7 Province/Region  
8 Training Camp  
 
1 Latitude & Longitude 
(Add later if necessary) 
People-> Location, Residence: 
 
1 Camp: Appears in, Owner of 
2 City/Village: Appears in 
3 Commercial Building: Appears in, Owner of  
4 Government Building: Appears in 
5 House: Appears in, Owner of 
6 Location: Appears in, 
7 Province/Region: Appears in 








from drop-down list 
required when tagging 
 
1 Alias(es), @ (AKA)  
2 Current Status (Target 
Status)*  
3 Education Level*  
4 Funding Source  
5 Religion (Ideology)  
6 Last Known Location 
(Lives IVO)  
7 Military Training 
(Skill)  
8 Nationality of 
Individual (Nationality)  
9 Occupation  





(POB/Originally From)  
12 Role Within 
Terrorist Network (Cell 




People-> People (& Org->Org): 
 
1 Affiliated/Associated  
2 Classmate of  
3 Coworker of  
4 Collaborates with  
5 Communicated with  
6 Enemy of  
7 Friend of  
8 Financier of  
9 Imprisoned with  
10 Kin of  
11 Linked to (Miscellaneous)  
12 Lover of  
13 Possibly same as  
14 Recruiter of  
15 Religious Leader of  




Objects Entity Properties Links 
Events: 
 
1 Armed Attack  
2 Arms Dealing  
3 Arrest  
4 Arson  
5 Assassination  
6 Bombing  
7 Burglary/Theft  
8 Combat Operation  
9 Event (General)  
10 Extortion  
11 Hijacking  
12 Kidnapping  
13 Law Enforcement Operation  
14 Meeting  
15 Military Operation  
16 Murder  
17 Payment  
18 Plot  
19 Political Event  
20 RPG Attack  
21 Sectarian Violence/Tribal Feud  
22 Smuggling  
23 Training Courses/Events 
(Training)  
24 Travel  
 
 
1 Date Range 
2 Latitude & Longitude 
 
People-> Event 
1 Affiliated/Associated: Used to affiliate a person 
or organization to an event without their necessarily 
willingness to take part, or to establish an 
unspecified or suspected association  
2 Participated in: Used when event is perpetrated 
by a person  
3 Victim of: Used when a person is the target or 
victim of an event (for arrest, police operations, 
etc., use “victim of” to link killed/arrested terrorists 
to the event, regardless of how you feel about 




Note: Be sure to code to the most-micro component of any organization entity. For 
instance, “Abu is a member of Abu Sayyaf’s Radullan Sahiron faction” should be coded 
as a membership link between Abu and the terrorist organization “Radullan Sahiron 
Faction (ASG).” 
Organization Properties: 
1. Funding Source: Use this property to identify funding sources amongst other 
organizations (rather than using a link between two organizations). 
2. Operates IVO: The specific municipality and/or province in which the 
organization operates. 
1. Academic Organization: Any institution dedicated to providing education (universities, 
madrasahs, pesantrens, etc.). 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Includes owners, teachers, staff, and administration.  
b. Student of (Teacher of): Use the “Teacher of” link type for the organization if 
the person was a student. For example, the organization is the “Teacher of” 
Muhammad.  
c. Visitor of: Use if person visited academic organization briefly, but was neither 
student nor staff.  
d. Affiliated/Associated: Use when someone is associated with the organization in 
a manner not listed above. Add explanation in notes field. 
2. Airport/Airfield: Any commercial or military facility that orchestrates the traffic of 
airplanes, jets, helicopters, or other airborne vehicles. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the Airport.  
b. Visitor of: Anyone visiting or otherwise tied to the airport other than 
employees. 
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3. Bank: An organization that primarily performs financial transactions.  
Link Types: 
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the bank. 
b. Financier of: Any depositor, financial recipient, or customer of the bank.  
c. Visitor of: Anyone tied to the bank but has neither financial nor employee ties. 
4. Business (Commercial Organization): For-profit organizations that employ people.  
Link Types: 
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the business.  
b. Financier of: Any depositor, financial recipient, or customer of the bank.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the business but who has neither financial 
nor employee ties. 
5. Charity (Non-Profit/Charitable Organization): An organization that focuses primarily 
on philanthropic goals. 
Link Types: 
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the charity but who has neither financial 
nor employee ties. 
6. Criminal Organization: A transnational, national, or local organization that is run by 
criminals for the purpose of engaging in illegal activity, particularly for monetary profit. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Member of: Anyone explicitly stated as being a member/ex-member of the 
organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Use to link people to the organization when relationship 
is unclear. Add explanation in notes field. 
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7. Government Organization: Organizations affiliated with a specific government.  
Link Types: 
a. Ex/Employee of: Officials or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization. 
 c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has neither 
financial nor employee ties. 
8. International Organization: Any international organization (e.g., United Nations, 
World Bank, NATO) whose mission specifies multinational cooperation and promotes 
intergovernmental cooperation among member nations. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Officials or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization. 
 c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has neither 
financial nor employee ties. 
9. Police Organization (Law Enforcement Organization): Defined as any organization 
labeled as local, regional, or national police. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Officers or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has neither 
financial nor employee ties (e.g., informants). 
10. Media Organization: Any commercial, state, or independent organization whose 
primary purpose is the production and dissemination of media or propaganda. 
Link Types: 
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization. 
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but has neither financial 
nor employee ties (e.g., sources). 
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11. Military Organization: A component of any state’s armed force that is required for 
national defense. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Officers, soldiers, or anyone employed directly by the 
organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has neither 
financial nor employee ties (e.g., informants). 
12. Mosque: A religious establishment specifically stated as a mosque.  
Link Types: 
a. Member/Ex: Anyone who attends the Mosque regularly or is otherwise stated 
as a member.  
b. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
c. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization. 
d. Visitor: Any visitor of the Mosque who does not fit in the above categories. 
13. Non-Governmental Organization (NGO): A legal organization that operates 
independently from any form of government and is not considered a commercial/business 
organization. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has neither 
financial nor employee ties. 
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14. Organization (General): Defined as an organization listed in any text that does not 
meet the definition of terrorist, political, religious, and government organizations, etc. 
Link Types:  
a. Ex/Employee of: Officials or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
b. Member/Ex: Anyone who is stated as a member of the organization.  
c. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
d. Visitor: Any visitors of the organization who do not fit in the above categories.  
e. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone tied to the organization but who has none of the 
links listed above. 
15. Political Organization: Defined as organizations registered as a political party or 
whose focus is political activism (i.e., non-government, non-terrorist/insurgency 
organizations). 
Link Types:  
a. Member/Ex: Anyone who attends political functions regularly or is otherwise 
stated as a member.  
b. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization.  
c. Financier of: Contributors or anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
d. Affiliated/Associated: Anyone with ties to the organization who does not fit in 
the above categories. 
16. Prison: An institution designed specifically for the jailing, imprisonment, or other 
enforced detention of individuals. 
Link Types:  
a. Member/Ex: Anyone who was incarcerated or formerly incarcerated in the 
prison.  
b. Ex/Employee of: Officials, guards, or anyone employed directly by the prison. 
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17. Religious Organization: Defined as religious study circles or religious institution 
other than mosques or synagogues. 
Link Types:  
a. Member/Ex: Anyone who attends the organization regularly or is otherwise 
stated as a member.  
b. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization. 
c. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization. 
d. Visitor: Any visitor of the organization who does not fit in the above 
categories. 
18. Synagogue: A religious establishment specifically stated as a synagogue.  
Link Types: 
a. Member/Ex: Anyone who attends the synagogue regularly or is otherwise stated 
as a member.  
b. Ex/Employee of: Owner or anyone employed directly by the organization. 
c. Financier of: Anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
d. Visitor: Any visitors of the synagogue who do not fit in the above categories. 
19. Terrorist/Insurgent Organization: Defined as an organization primarily involved in 
terrorist activities and that is not registered as a political, business, or government 
organization. 
Link Types:  
a. Member of/Ex: Anyone explicitly stated as being a member/ex-member of the 
organization. 
b. Financier of: anyone with financial ties to the organization.  
c. Affiliated/Affiliated: Use to link people to the organization when relationship is 




1. Latitude & Longitude: Use this property to pin location entities on the map. 
Note that users may find it easier to use additional platforms (e.g., Google Earth, 
wikimapia) to find remote or obscure locations. 
Location Relationship Types: 
1. Appears in: Use whenever a person is identified as visiting, living, meeting in, 
or otherwise appearing in any of the locations in the following list.  
2. Owner of: When applicable, link the (person) owner to the following location 
entities. 
1. Camp: A permanent or semi-permanent base of operations for groups of people in 
unincorporated areas. This can be used for mobile militant groups who move frequently 
between locations, or as a specific militant base whose location is within a larger 
municipality or administrative region. 
2. City/Village: An incorporated municipality or administrative town area that has a 
name.  
3. Commercial Building: A building used for commercial purposes (i.e., non-residential 
buildings). 
4. Government Building: A building owned or used by a state or governmental 
organization (e.g., embassy, passport office, courthouse). 
5. House: A residence owned or inhabited by people. This includes apartments, condos, 
flats, safe-houses, huts, etc. 
6. Location: If city or town is unspecified include the general district, county, regency, 
etc. (for Provinces, see number 7). 
7. Province/Region: This property is used to record the most general of locations: the 
provincial level. Do not record locations that cannot be narrowed down to a specific 
province—for example, “Al-Ghozi was last seen in Sulu, Philippines” would be coded as 
an Al-Ghozi “Appears In” Sulu, Philippines (Sulu province) relationship rather than Al-
Ghozi “Appears In” the Philippines. 
Note: Depending on the country of study, the “city/village,” “location,” 
and “Province/Region” definitions may need to be tailored based on that 
country’s administrative department structure. 
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8. Training Camp: A permanent or semi-permanent location used primarily for training 
(i.e., a camp constructed for the purpose of training, whose visitors then move on to other 
areas for operations). 
People 
All people (government officials, terrorist figures, etc.) will all be coded as “person” 
entities. 
Person Properties: Note, * indicates use of drop-down list options required for parsing. 
1. Alias: Alternative names used to conceal one’s identity. 
2. * Current Status (“Target Status”): Defined as the physical condition of the 
individual. The default is “alive” if there is a lack of information. Add any additional 
information (i.e. “Abu was shot and surrendered to the police”) to the notes section. 
Coding Scale: (leave blank for “alive”) a. Deceased, b. Suspected Deceased, c. 
Detained (jailed, arrested), d. Target (wanted) 
3. * Education Level (“Education Level”): Defined as highest degree attained, level 
taught at, studied, participated in, attended or is the organizational leader/director of an 
institution at a specified level based on available information. 
Coding Scale: Choose best available option. 
4. Funding Source: The means by which the actor obtains funding.  
Coding Scale: e.g., Narcotics Trafficking, Human Trafficking, Fa’i (Robbery), 
Kidnapping, etc. 
5. Religion: Use this property to distinguish specific religious properties of actors; it is 
not necessary to tag general religious properties such as Christian, Muslim, etc. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Balik Islam (convert/revert to Islam), Salafist, Sufi 
6. Last Known Location (“Lives IVO”): The last known location from which the actor 
operates, suspected location, or where escaped arrest. Please be as specific as possible. 
Again, only record data from the provincial-level down. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Jakarta, Zamboanga City, Basilan Island 
7. Military Training (“Skill”): Defined as the location where an individual received 
military training and/or attained veteran status in fighting in known 
insurgent/conventional wars. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Peshawar, Pakistan, Iraq, Ambon 
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8. Nationality of Individual (“Nationality”): Defined as country of birth, citizenship, or 
residence. This can include several countries. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Afghanistan, Indonesia, Palestinian (Gaza, West Bank) 
9. Occupation: This property describes the occupation or profession of the actor and not 
his role (i.e., bomb-maker, spiritual leader) within the terrorist organization. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Shopkeeper, Teacher, Constable 
10. Primary Group Affiliation (“Group Affiliation”): Defined as the primary group 
affiliation of each member, specifically. This attribute considers sub-components in order 
to attain an individual’s most micro-level affiliation available. Individuals with more than 
one affiliation are considered to have a primary affiliation with both groups. 
Coding Scale: e.g., MILF Special Operations Group (MILF-SOG), ASG, JI 
Wakalah Singapore 
11. Residence/Hometown (“POB/Originally From”): Used when information provided 
states actor is “originally from” or “born in” an area that can be coded from the 
provincial-level down. 
Coding Scale: e.g., Barangay Ipil, Maimbung, Jolo, Sulu 
12. * Role within Terrorist Network (“Cell Member Function”): Defined as the role an 
individual assumes in the terrorist/insurgent network. Of course, coding several roles is 
permitted, given most actors hold more than one role. 
Coding Scale: Choose best available option 7 
13. Tribal Affiliation/Ethnic Group (“Tribe”): This property describes the ethnic group, 
tribal affiliation, or other ethnically-based attribute explicitly stated in the document. 




Note this code book does not contain a separate section for organization-to-organization 
relationships, so please follow the same definitions for those scenarios. 
1. Affiliated/Associated: Two actors who are explicitly stated as “associates.” 
2. Classmate of: Two people who attend (faculty, student, administration, etc.) the same 
academic institution at the same time. This option will be used to identify educational 
colleagues. 
3. Co-Worker of: People who work with one another at the same institution at the same 
time. This does not include terrorist/insurgent organizations. 
4. Collaborates with: Two or more actors who are explicitly stated as collaborating in 
some unspecified nefarious activity (not including financial transactions). For example, 
two actors or terrorist components who work together on weapons trafficking would 
receive this link. However, for specific events (i.e., “July 2008 attack on police in 
Ambon”) the actors will be linked to a specific node entity (two-mode), which would most 
likely receive a “participated in” link. 
5. Communicated with: Two actors with direct communication through some medium 
(cell phone, radio, received an order in writing). This does not include specific 
meetings/conferences or a generic encounter. Note: We may have to incorporate the 
“Superior/Subordinate” link with this since we are assuming immediate superiors and 
subordinates communicate. 
6. Enemy of: Two actors explicitly stated as enemies.  
7. Friend of: Two actors explicitly stated as friends. 
8. Financier of: Two actors who are explicitly stated as transferring funds between one 
another. Do not include “normal” activities as an employer paying an employee, or a 
client purchasing goods from a manufacturer. 
9. Imprisoned with: Two actors who are or have been imprisoned together. 
10. Kin of: Defined as any family connection such as spouse, brother, brother-in-law, 
nephew, etc. (parse kinship type/relationship in notes section). 
11. Linked to: Use this link type for miscellaneous relationships that do not appear 
elsewhere in this code book. Add relevant information in notes section. 
12. Lover of: Defined as affectionate but non-marital relationships between two actors 
(i.e., girlfriends, etc.). 
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13. Possibly same as: Used to connect two actors who might be the same person. 
14. Recruiter of: Defined as contact between two individuals for the purpose of enlisting 
new members for terrorist/insurgency-related activities. Recruiting relations are only 
relevant when the attempt to enlist members has been successful. 
15. Religious Leader of: Defined as actors’ affiliation in the spiritual/religious context. 
16. Superior/Subordinate of: Defined as relationships between immediate superiors and 
subordinates. These ties should be explicitly stated in the text and should not be based on 
assumptions. 
Link Note Section and Browser Note Section: Please include any important and/or 
relevant notes about the nature of relationships, descriptions of actors, etc. 
 
Events 
All events must have a date, location, and a brief description in their title whenever 
possible (e.g., “12 October 2002 Bali Bombings” or “00 April 2003 Dulmatin Flees 
Mindanao”). Please code only events that have at least a year description in the text (i.e., 
“2000 Manila Bombings” and NOT “Manila Bombings”). Moreover, ALL DATES AND 
GEO-LOCATIONS MUST BE CODED AND ADDED TO THE “DATE” AND “LAT-
LONG” PROPERTY FIELDS SO WE CAN UTILIZE GEOSPATIAL AND TEMPORAL 
ANALYSIS IN FUTURE PROJECTS AND PAPERS. Coding event titles with a numeric 
beginning (e.g., 00 May 2003 if exact day is unknown) will make exporting event data 
much easier later on. 
Event Properties: 
1. Date: In addition to adding temporal information in the event title, add the date 
or date range of the event as precisely as possible to utilize temporal analysis of 
the events. 
2. Latitude/Longitude: Using Palantir’s map application, or other GIS tool (e.g., 
Google Earth, Wikimapia) pinpoint each event to its respective area using 
Lat/Long coordinates. 
Person or Organization to Event Link Types: 
1. Affiliated/Associated: Used to associate a person or organization to an event 
without that entity’s necessarily willingness to take part, or to establish an 
unspecified, suspected, or accused association to the event.  
2. Participated in: Used when a person or organization actively and knowingly 
perpetrates an event. 
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3. Victim of: Used when a person or organization is the target or victim of an 
event. (Note: For arrests, military operations, etc., use “victim of” to link killed or 
arrested terrorist actors regardless of how we feel about labeling them as victims). 
1. Armed Attack: Any armed confrontation that is not a bombing or general combat. 
2. Arms Dealing: An event where weapons changed hands between dealer/supplier, 
middleman, and end-user/militant. 
3. Arrest: Any event when authorities arrest an actor and there is a specific date (i.e., 
month and/or year). 
4. Arson: Any attack when a fire was deliberately set and meant to harm persons or 
damage property. 
5. Assassination: A fatal attack targeting a specific, high profile individual. 
6. Bombing: Any attack where a bomb, IED, or other explosive device was the primary 
source of damage or casualties. 
7. Burglary/Theft: An act involving the illegal dispossession of property. 
8. Combat Operation: Defined as combat between at least two parties. These differ from 
“armed attack,” “law enforcement operation,” and “military operation” in that we do not 
know which party instigated the event (i.e., “Al-Ghozi participated in combat against 
government forces in May 2002 in Mindanao” is coded as “00 May 2002 Combat in 
Mindanao”). 
9. Event (General): Any incident that has a specific date (i.e., month and/or a year) and 
that does not meet the definition of the event-types listed elsewhere in this code book. 
10. Extortion: Any event where a person is blackmailed in exchange for money, services, 
or other profit to the extorter. 
11. Hijacking: Any event where a vehicle carrying passengers is taken by force by 
nefarious actors. 
12. Kidnapping: An event where a person is taken by force by a nefarious group 
intending to affect some kind of financial gain by holding the prisoner hostage. 
13. Law Enforcement Operation: Defined as operations initiated by government police 
forces. 
14. Meeting: A preplanned, coordinated event between at least two actors with a specific 
date (e.g., “2003 Abu and Noordin Meeting in Jakarta”). If a meeting cannot be narrowed 
down to a specific month and year, use the “met with” relationship between actors. 
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15. Military Operation: Defined as operations initiated by government security forces.  
16. Murder: An event involving the deliberate killing of an individual, and which does 
not fall within other categories listed in this code book. 
17. Payment: A willing exchange of money from one person/party to another. 
18. Plot: Any detailed scheme or planned attack that includes a target, location, and 
affiliated persons involved in the operation. For example, “ASG/JI Marwan Plan to buy 
Barret 50 caliber sniping gun to take down helicopters and planes used by the Americans 
in SULU Airport.” If limited detail does not warrant creating a plot event, use 
“collaborates with” instead to link collaborating persons. 
19. Political Event: Any initially non-violent event where individuals congregate for the 
purpose of demonstrating, protesting, or supporting a political party or issue. 
20. RPG Attack: Any event where a rocket-propelled grenade or other man-portable 
rocket launcher was used. 
21. Sectarian Violence/Tribal Feud: Any event where the nature of the attack appears to 
be based on sectarian, communal, or ethnic divisions between groups. 
22. Smuggling: Any instance of either the illegal transportation of legal goods to avoid 
taxation or seizure, or the transportation of illegal goods with intent to distribute without 
detection. 
23. Training Courses/Events (Training): Any designed event that teaches the knowledge, 
skills, and competencies of terrorism and insurgency. These are coded as regular events 
with an appropriate title indicating the date, location, and description. 
24. Travel: Any movement on a specific date (i.e., month and/or a year) including at least 
two actors. For example, “Dulmatin and Umar Patek fled to Mindanao in 2002” would be 
coded something like “2002 Dulmatin and Umar Patek Flee to Mindanao.” 
Note on “Communications:” Coding communication events, such as the issuing of 
fatwas, is not necessary for our purposes here. Communications between two actors can 
be coded directly as “Communicated With” ties. 
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